

PERFORMANCE AUDIT

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

ADULT INSTITUTIONS SECURITY

Report to the Arizona Legislature
By the Auditor General
November 1985
85-12



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STATE OF ARIZONA
OFFICE OF THE
AUDITOR GENERAL

November 21, 1985

Members of the Arizona Legislature
The Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Governor
Samuel A. Lewis, Director
Department of Corrections

Transmitted herewith is a report of the Auditor General, A Performance Audit of the Department of Corrections, Adult Institutions Security. This report is in response to the January 30, 1985 resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee.

The report addresses deficiencies in perimeter and internal security at the adult institutions, and problems in controlling contraband. We found the security risks arising from these conditions are compounded by misclassification of inmates which results in higher risk inmates being placed in lower security facilities. Finally, we found the Department's current construction program will not provide enough maximum custody beds to meet current or future needs.

My staff and I will be pleased to discuss or clarify items in the report.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Douglas R. Norton".

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Enclosure

SUMMARY

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) security function. This audit was conducted in response to a January 30, 1985, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee which requires a performance audit of DOC, and is one in a series of audits of the Department.

The findings discussed below summarize serious problems in institutional security. The report does not disclose specific details because such details could be used as a "blueprint" for further security breaches. However, the Department has been fully informed of all identified problems to allow it to take necessary corrective action. Some of these corrective actions may take time to implement. According to the security consultants retained by the Auditor General, many of DOC's security deficiencies developed over a long period of time, and are the result of inadequate resources or inadequate management of these resources. In addition, changes affecting inmate activities and privileges should be made gradually to minimize inmate tension and hostility which could lead to additional security problems.

Security At Various Adult Prisons Is Inadequate (see Finding I, pages 5 through 18)

DOC does not provide adequate security at some of its adult correctional facilities. N.R. Cox and Associates, a corrections consulting firm retained by the Auditor General to assist in analyzing security at DOC's adult institutions, identified security deficiencies at many of the adult facilities. At some institutions these security deficiencies result in security levels below that necessary for the resident population.

Perimeter security deficiencies currently exist in fences, electronic detection systems, use of guard towers and visibility at many of the adult facilities. For example, all but two of the facilities visited by Auditor General security consultants lacked inner fences secured in cement, and sufficient razor wire and razor tape to discourage escape or intrusion attempts. In addition, the electronic detection systems at Arizona State

Prison Complex (ASPC)-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville have been extremely slow in activating alarms and have failed to activate intrusion alarms on some occasions. These perimeter security inadequacies have created opportunities for escapes. Between January 1984 and May 1985 a total of 56 inmates escaped through the perimeters of the various adult institutions.

Security deficiencies within the various facilities have created unnecessary risks for both inmates and staff. For example, at ASPC-Florence Central Unit the locking mechanism to cellblock 1 has shorted out and rusted due to the leaky showers. Consequently, cell doors do not function electronically and must be opened manually. As a result correctional service officers must carry keys to open individual cells and keys that open the front door to the facility. In addition, in the Central Unit cellblock 2, the facility's locking system does not work properly. In order to open one cell door on a tier, all of the 26 cells must be opened at once.

Although DOC has made efforts to identify and remedy security deficiencies, additional work is necessary. To improve security, DOC should take an inventory of perimeter and internal security needs and deficiencies, correct those that can be addressed immediately and request adequate funding from the Legislature to correct the remaining deficiencies.

The Department Of Corrections Does Not Adequately
Control Contraband (see Finding II, pages 19 thorough 35)

DOC has not effectively prevented the introduction of contraband into correctional facilities or adequately controlled internal sources of contraband. Lack of sufficient DOC staff or inadequate staff observation during visitations has resulted in violations of DOC's policies forbidding prolonged embracing, kissing and petting between inmates and visitors. Such contact is not only forbidden by Department policy, but provides extreme potential for transferring contraband. Current food and open yard practices, inoperable metal detectors, and inadequate searches also allow contraband to enter correctional facilities undetected.

Internal sources of contraband are also improperly controlled by DOC. For example:

- Tools were unsecured at the ARCOR building at ASPC-Perryville. Wire cutters, long shears, files, etc. were observed in an unlocked cabinet. There was no supervision in the area. Our consultants took several of these items and left the grounds with them. Ten days later the tools had not been reported missing.
- An open box of syringes was observed in a supply room at Alhambra where an unsupervised inmate was working.
- An unsecured portable acetylene welding torch was observed in the ASPC-Florence Central Unit maintenance shop by the consultants.

The Department Of Corrections Misclassifies
Adult Inmates, Which Increases Security Risks
(see Finding III, pages 37 through 44)

DOC's inmate classification system does not properly classify adult male inmates. Results of an evaluation by Correctional Services Group, Inc., a correctional consulting firm retained by the Auditor General's Office, indicates that the Department is underclassifying inmates. More than 6 percent of the inmates sampled currently classified as minimum custody or lower would be assigned to maximum custody by the Federal Prison System's (FPS) Custody Determination Instrument. Overall, the evaluation found that DOC reclassifies only 18 percent of its inmate population as maximum custody, while the FPS instrument indicates that 31 percent should be reclassified as maximum custody. Although the FPS model has not been validated for the Arizona inmate population, the large difference in results indicates significant misclassification.

Misclassification increases security risks because higher custody inmates are placed in lower custody facilities. These security risks are further increased by DOC's inadequate facility security. Two medium facilities were rated as only minimum facilities by the security consultants. Thus, maximum custody inmates who are misclassified as medium may actually be housed in minimum custody facilities.

The Current Construction Program Will Not Provide
The Department With Enough Maximum Custody
Beds (see Finding IV, pages 45 through 52)

According to analysis conducted by the Auditor General's classification consultants, DOC's current prison construction program will not provide enough maximum and minimum custody beds to meet projected needs. Although DOC will have an excess of medium custody beds, the analysis indicates that DOC could be short as many as 1,000 maximum custody beds at the completion of the current construction program in March 1987. The consultants used the objective, validated Federal Bureau of Prisons classification model. Although this model may not be completely valid for the Arizona inmate population, the large difference in results from Arizona's present system indicates that the Department lacks sufficient maximum custody beds. Using the Department's conservative estimate of \$45,000 per bed to construct maximum custody facilities, as much as \$45 million of construction may be required to build enough additional maximum security beds to meet custody requirements by March 1987.

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Office of the Auditor General has conducted a performance audit of the Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) security function. This audit was conducted in response to a January 30, 1985, resolution of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee which requires a performance audit of DOC, and is one in a series of audits on the Department.

DOC's role is to protect the public by safely and securely confining those individuals entrusted to its care. In addition to protecting society from the sentenced offenders, the Department should ensure that its facilities provide a safe, just and humane environment. The Department maintains facilities of various custody levels and classifies offenders among these levels.

Facilities And Inmate Population

Through its Division of Adult Institutions and Division of Juvenile/Community Services, the Department maintains 25 facilities Statewide ranging from maximum custody units to correctional release centers, to house approximately 8,000 inmates. Perimeter and internal security features determine a unit's custody level. The Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC) in Florence, constructed in 1912, houses approximately 2,800 inmates in seven units. Two of the seven units house the inmates classified most dangerous by the Department. ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville Training Centers, opened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, house the majority of the remaining medium and minimum custody adult population. Future prison construction programs will add approximately 4,540 beds to the existing 7,768 beds for adult male inmates. The majority of these beds will be added to the Florence and Tucson facilities, and new facilities being constructed at Douglas, Winslow and Yuma.

The Department currently houses approximately 8,000 adult male inmates. Inmate population has increased at a rate of approximately 75 inmates per month since January 1981. The Department's current forecast predicts an increase of approximately 55 inmates per month over the next three years.

Escape Statistics

Security deficiencies can and have resulted in escapes at Arizona Correctional facilities. As of May 1985 DOC had 65 outstanding escapees from its institutions. Fifty-two of these escapees are outstanding since January 1, 1980. Fourteen remain outstanding prior to January 1, 1980. Escape activity for the past six years is listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1

ESCAPE ACTIVITY
1980 THROUGH MAY 1985

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 ⁽¹⁾
Escapes	74	109	61	73	80	39
Arrests	73	104	54	61	72	12
Outstanding	1	5	7	12	8	19

(1) Table does not include escapes from halfway houses or parole, or any juvenile escapes.

Source: DOC Central Office, Inspections & Investigations Section

Staffing And Budget

According to JLBC appropriations reports for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1985, an estimated 3,024 of DOC's 4,006 authorized full-time employee positions (FTE) were allocated to the Division of Adult Institutions, which includes all adult prisons. Table 2 shows actual expenditures for fiscal years 1983 and 1984, and estimated expenditures for fiscal years 1985 and 1986.

TABLE 2

DOC EXPENDITURES
DIVISION OF ADULT INSTITUTIONS
FISCAL YEARS 1983 THROUGH 1986

(UNAUDITED)

	Actual 1983	Actual 1984	Estimated 1985	Estimated ⁽¹⁾ 1986
FTE Positions	2,152.7	2,591.1	3,024.5	2,986.2
Expenditures:				
Personal Services	\$38,758,900	\$41,818,800	\$53,397,400	\$ 57,357,300
Employee Related	9,287,900	10,612,200	14,303,700	15,094,400
All Other Expenses	<u>18,653,700</u>	<u>22,277,700</u>	<u>27,002,700</u>	<u>30,326,700</u>
Total	<u>\$66,700,500</u>	<u>\$74,708,700</u>	<u>\$94,703,800</u>	<u>\$102,778,400</u>

(1) On June 20, 1985, DOC underwent a reorganization, at which time the Division of Adult Institutions, formerly Adult Services, was created. As part of the reorganization funding for 175.5 positions related to adult community services and previously funded as part of the Adult Services program was transferred to the Division of Juvenile/Community Services. This change is reflected in the figures shown.

Source: JLBC Appropriations Reports, June 1984 and June 1985

Audit Scope And Objectives

This audit report focuses on the Department's ability to perform its security functions efficiently and effectively. The report presents findings and recommendations in four major areas.

- The ability of DOC to adequately maintain security at adult institutions,
- The ability of DOC to control contraband,
- The adequacy of DOC's classification system, and
- The ability of DOC to provide proper security level inmate housing.

The report's findings summarize serious problems in institutional security. The report does not disclose specific details because such details could be used as a "blueprint" for further security breaches. However, the Department has been fully informed of all identified problems to allow it to take necessary corrective action. Some of these corrective actions may take time to implement. According to the security consultants retained by the Auditor General, many of DOC's security deficiencies developed over a long period of time, and are the result of inadequate resources or inadequate management of these resources. In addition, changes affecting inmate activities and privileges should be made gradually to minimize inmate tension and hostility which could lead to additional security problems.

We developed other pertinent information regarding the feasibility of inmate early release option to alleviate prison overcrowding, the adequacy of the Alhambra facility and the lack of sufficient disciplinary isolation cells. Due to time constraints, we were unable to address all potential issues identified during our audit work. The section Areas For Further Audit Work describes these potential issues.

The Auditor General and staff express appreciation to the Director of the Department of Corrections and his staff for their cooperation and assistance during the audit.

FINDING I

SECURITY AT VARIOUS ADULT PRISONS IS INADEQUATE

The Department of Corrections (DOC) does not provide adequate security at some of its adult correctional facilities. The perimeters at many institutions do not effectively prevent or hinder escape attempts. Security problems inside prisons pose risks to both staff and inmates. As a result of these deficiencies, several institutions do not provide the level of security necessary for the resident populations. DOC needs to place greater emphasis on security through both immediate and long-range actions.

The Auditor General retained N. R. Cox and Associates, a corrections consulting firm, to assist in analyzing security at DOC's adult institutions. As part of the review the consulting team visited and analyzed security at the Florence, Perryville, Alhambra, Tucson and Fort Grant facilities. In addition, the consultants addressed various department-wide security issues. These included inmate classification, available bed space, protective custody inmates, dissemination of inmate gang information, and development of needed policies, procedures or post orders. For details of their findings see Appendix I.

Perimeter Security Deficiencies Lead To Escapes

Although strong perimeter security is necessary to prevent escapes, perimeters at a number of Arizona's adult facilities are seriously deficient. Perimeter deficiencies exist in fences, electronic detection systems, use of guard towers and visibility. As a result, inmates have taken advantage of inadequate perimeter security to escape.

A strong and secure perimeter enclosure can help prevent escapes and minimize risks to the public. Escapes and intrusion attempts are delayed, and sometimes prevented by a network of fences, walls, towers and electronic detection devices. Good perimeter security systems have

fence lines that are well lighted and unobstructed. The degree of perimeter security varies among minimum, medium and maximum custody prisons. Minimum security institutions usually require no perimeter fence other than a general purpose fence to discourage unauthorized traffic in or about the main compound. The Design Guide for Secure Adult Correctional Facilities, published by the American Correctional Association, says "an extremely secure perimeter" has ". . . a double fence and integral electronic intrusion and alarm devices, coupled with new types of concertina wire. Such fence systems are very satisfactory for perimeter security, particularly when mobile patrols are also used." Furthermore, maximum security institutions may require additional underground detection systems as well as subsoil barriers. The guidebook states that "A reliable perimeter security system allows inside operations to be more relaxed with less need for constant observation of the inmate's every movement and a resulting reduction in both inmate and staff tensions."

Fencing - Some DOC institutions do not have enough reinforced fencing to prevent inmate escapes. A facility inspection conducted by Auditor General security consultants revealed that perimeter security fencing was inadequate at most adult institutions. Inmates have been able to cut, climb over, dig under and slip under fences, tear fence meshing, and cover razor wire on fences with blankets to effect escapes. With the exception of the Rincon Unit at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Tucson, and the Central Unit and cellblock 6 at ASPC-Florence, all other facilities visited lacked inner fences secured in cement, and sufficient razor wire and razor tape to discourage escape or intrusion attempts. Moreover, ASP-Fort Grant, a minimum custody facility, does not have any fence whatsoever. ASP-Fort Grant has experienced more escapes than any other prison complex during the last year and one-half. The consultants recommend that at least a single fence be constructed to contain the inmates at this facility.

Detection Systems - Deficiencies in electronic perimeter detection equipment also present problems. Lack of maintenance of and support for

these systems at ASPC-Tucson and ASPC-Perryville have been responsible for persistent system failures. For example:

- Institutional alarm display boards that indicate perimeter security intrusions do not always correspond with information displayed on the complex main control board.
- The computer operating the electronic detection equipment has responded slowly to user commands, has been extremely slow in printing alarms, and has failed to print intrusion alarms on some occasions.
- Once activated, institutional fence alarms must be shaken repeatedly to secure the alarms.
- Temperature and moisture have caused alarms not to respond, or to remain in constant alarm mode.

Some inmate escapes were made possible as a direct result of system malfunctions. Once inmates become aware of system failures they are able to test fence alarms and determine which zones are inoperative. Additionally, some inmates have been able to elude the electronic alarm systems. Though DOC has tried to eliminate vulnerable areas that inmates can penetrate without being detected, some still exist.

Guard Towers - Security at the perimeter is also weakened by guard towers that are improperly placed, incorrectly used and poorly constructed. Some towers are not effective because temporary structures have been placed in their lines of sight. This creates blind spots for tower officers and limits visibility. In addition, some towers are ineffective because they are being used to observe inmates rather than maintain surveillance of the perimeter as intended. Moreover, Auditor General security consultants determined that some towers are not even safe for extended use, because they are temporary structures of scaffolding and plywood. These towers pose unsafe working conditions.

Visibility - Poor lighting and lines of sight reduce perimeter visibility. While placement of perimeter lighting is adequate, the untimely replacement of burned-out bulbs reduces its effectiveness. Observation is further limited by barriers in the lines of sight. For example, at one facility the perimeter fence curves at various points,

which reduces straight-line visibility along its length. Perimeter fences should be straight-line for good observation. At some facilities lines of sight are broken by small piles of dirt deposited along the bottom of the fence to cover and prevent holes under the fence. This provides a hiding spot for prisoners. For example, perimeter patrol officers at one institution are unable to see if inmates are lying behind earthen obstructions during night hours.

Escapes - Perimeter security inadequacies have created opportunities for escapes. Between January 1984 and May 1985, 56* inmates escaped through the perimeters of DOC facilities. Some of these escapees have committed crimes against life and property while they were out.

- In 1983 an inmate from ASP-Fort Grant escaped and terrorized an elderly couple for several hours.
- In 1984 an ASPC-Tucson Tent Unit inmate, who twice penetrated perimeter security systems to escape, committed a homicide during a burglary in Illinois.
- In 1984 an ASPC-Perryville escapee was reported stealing cars. Though local law enforcement authorities have received several such reports, this inmate still remains at large.
- In 1985 an ASPC-Perryville inmate was captured by Portland, Oregon, authorities, and held on charges of committing armed robbery while on escape.

Though most offenders are recaptured, some inmates still remain at large and continue to place the public at risk.

Internal Security Problems Pose Risks To Both Inmates And Staff

Security deficiencies within DOC adult institutions threaten both staff and inmates. Although effective internal security features help maintain institutional control, security personnel are often limited in their ability to control inmate activity. Specifically, problems with locking

* This figure does not include those inmates who have successfully escaped while on work details and furloughs.

systems, control rooms, communications, policies and procedures, and staffing jeopardize institutional security and safety.

A variety of internal security features help provide institutional control. Adequate locking mechanisms allow inmates to be contained or isolated. A control center is important because all institutional activity is monitored at this location. The physical layout of an institution's housing units is critical for proper inmate observation and supervision. Radio communications systems also enhance institutional control. Further, policies and procedures provide staff with important instructions on the day-to-day tasks that must be carried out to maintain institutional control. Lastly, inmate observation and control is maintained through appropriate staffing patterns at correctional facilities.

Locks - Locking systems do not fully secure inmates at several Arizona prisons, and pose significant risks to inmates and staff. Locking problems stem from lack of adequate maintenance* and inadequate locking device designs at some facilities. The following examples illustrate the extensive problems.

- At ASPC-Florence Central Unit, the locking mechanism to cellblock 1 has shorted out and rusted due to the leaky showers. Cell doors do not function electronically and must be opened manually. As a result, correctional service officers must carry keys to open individual cells and keys that open the front door to the facility.
- At ASPC-Florence Central Unit cellblock 2, the facility's locking system does not work properly. In order to open one cell door on a tier, all of the 26 cells must be opened at once. This is particularly dangerous because protective custody** inmates are housed in this facility.

* Black and Veatch, engineering and architectural consultants retained by the Auditor General, estimates the inspection, replacement and renovation of locking systems and related equipment at ASPC-Florence and ASPC-Perryville would cost from \$395,000 to \$2,132,000 (see forthcoming Auditor General DOC Maintenance audit report, Finding I).

** Protective custody inmates are separated from the general prison population because of threats to their safety by other inmates.

- At ASPC-Florence Central Unit cellblock 4, the doors on several cell runs do not function properly. In order to open one cell door, all cell doors must be opened. Many inmates have the opportunity to leave their cells at the same time.
- At ASPC-Perryville and ASPC-Tucson, faulty locking mechanisms allow inmates to open their room doors once they are closed. Housing unit doors can be opened from the inside by an obstruction jammed in the space between the door frame and the door. Burned-out indicator lights do not inform the control room staff when doors are open.
- At ASPC-Perryville and ASPC-Tucson inmate room keys can be used as semi-master keys when worn down, allowing inmates to gain access to other rooms for theft.

Control Centers - Control centers are poorly secured at all but one of the institutions visited. Control centers within cellblocks control access to and from the cellblock and the cells within, and allow observation of inmate movement. Our consultants found that some control centers lack bulletproof safety glass, have safety glass that is improperly mounted, or have doors that are easy to penetrate. As the control room is the nerve center for the entire facility, unauthorized access by groups of inmates would render a facility totally vulnerable. For example, during a 1980 New Mexico riot inmates were able to break control center windows and enter the control room in three to five minutes. Once inside the inmates obtained keys, gas grenades, a tear gas launcher, riot helmets and batons. Control centers in Arizona facilities contain similar types of emergency response equipment and weapons, and unsecured key boxes.

Temporary Structures - The use and location of temporary structures for inmate housing reduce internal security. Tents, trailers, quonset huts and other temporary structures that lack basic security features are being widely used. Auditor General security consultants concluded that the use of these structures for housing obstructs vision and necessitates a higher level of staffing to maintain adequate surveillance and control. These structures are not designed to provide for proper inmate observation. Further, these structures are constructed with materials not designed to withstand extensive use or to serve as security barriers. They are likely to become less secure with time.

Communications Systems - Security personnel lack sufficient radios and frequencies to provide proper inmate custody and control. A limited number of radio channels results in extensive cross traffic and blocks communication. A recent escape illustrates the problem of having too few frequencies.

- Inmates were able to steal a portable radio and jam the transmit switch to produce a continuous transmit tone. This delayed other units from responding to a reported escape, long enough for the inmates to make their exit.

At some institutions, complex security lacks a separate frequency to guarantee open channel communications in the event of a security emergency. Also, some security personnel do not have radios. For example:

- In ASPC-Florence South Unit, housing unit officers do not have radios. One housing officer is assigned to each dorm and must supervise 72 inmates. Though guard stations in these dorms are equipped with telephones, a correctional service officer leaving this area becomes vulnerable without any communications equipment.

Auditor General security consultants believe that each dormitory or housing unit should have at least one radio for routine and emergency communications.

Likewise, every tower post should be equipped with a portable radio. Currently, only ASPC-Tucson has radios for tower personnel. ASPC-Florence tower posts have telephones only. The size and complexity of some units as well as the custody levels of the inmates dictate the need for additional equipment.

Policies And Procedures - Problems with DOC policies and procedures present risks to staff and inmates. These departmental policies and procedures are deficient or are not readily adhered to. For instance:

- Control of Medication - The Department lacks a consistent policy on recording or inventorying medical supplies, specifically

controlled substances. Additionally, some institutions are dispensing medication in multiple doses to inmates. Inmates could save their drugs and sell them at a later time. Auditor General security consultants recommend that DOC adopt a policy which states that medication be issued in single doses only (see Finding II, page 28).

- Inmate Counts - Inmate counting checks required by DOC are insufficient in number and limited in scope. Department policy only requires three formal counts per day. There is too long a span between counts during which inmates may be unaccounted for throughout the day. Auditor General security consultants recommend that a minimum of five counts be conducted in each 24 hour period. Maximum and minimum custody inmates should be accounted for once every three hours. Inmate counts are a major method of accounting for inmates and preventing or deterring escape attempts. Also, DOC policy does not require inmates to stand next to their bunks or workstations to be visually inspected and counted. The consultants recommend that DOC require mandatory standing counts at least once per shift.
- Tool Control - Though tool control policies and procedures exist, they are not consistently complied with. Policies and procedures require that tools, equipment, and toxic and flammable materials be secured. Throughout the audit numerous items including hacksaws, blades, wire cutters, propane, gasoline, portable welding and cutting torches, ladders, rebar, and pipe stock were found unsecured (see Finding II, page 24).
- Visitation - Though visitation policies and procedures exist, they are not being adhered to either. DOC security personnel do not adequately monitor visitation activities. A lack of monitoring has enabled inmates to commit crimes, as well as provide opportunities for guests to wander about facilities to commit illegal acts (see Finding II, page 20).

Staffing - Auditor General consultants identified staffing practices as a potential security problem. Staffing patterns vary widely throughout the Department's adult institutions. No consistent method for calculating a shift relief factor to determine the number of staff needed to maintain each post exists. Though numerous examples of inadequate staffing were found throughout the audit, Auditor General security consultants were unable to determine whether they were due to insufficient numbers of personnel, inefficient deployment of personnel or inadequate evaluation of personnel. The consultants recommend that the Department conduct a

comprehensive staffing study to determine the extent of its staffing problems.*

Security Ratings At Several Facilities Are Too High

Because of the problems in both perimeter and internal security within DOC facilities, Auditor General security consultants rated several facilities at lower levels than they were designated by the Department. The custody capabilities of these institutions are not consistent with their ratings.

The facility custody level ratings of some institutions are inappropriate to provide adequate security for the type of inmates housed within.** Auditor General security consultants examined custody ratings for several institutions. Our consultants found these facility custody ratings to be overrated and not clearly delineated. Facility custody levels are determined after an assessment of security factors, which include perimeter security systems, observation towers, internal and external patrols, electronic detection devices, housing arrangements, cells, and level of staffing for population size. Institutions with inappropriate custody level ratings are as follows.

- ASPC-Phoenix (Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center) is being used to house maximum custody inmates, though the facility is only rated by the consultants as minimum custody. Maximum custody level inmates require a secure, highly controlled environment. At initial classification offenders who have committed violent and aggravated crimes receive this status.

* DOC is in the process of implementing a staffing study that will examine whether staffing patterns are adequate. Though DOC plans to conduct a comprehensive study including a post analysis, its study may not include several important elements. Auditor General security consultants believe that a post analysis/post audit should include many elements of time and motion studies. The study should examine work requirements and work load and how they vary from shift to shift. Other factors should include the level, type and patterns of activity that take place in the institution during the 24 hour day. Another important factor to consider is staff needed to respond in emergency situations.

** DOC uses five facility custody levels: community custody, minimum, medium and maximum custody, and administrative segregation.

- ASPC-Florence South Unit, which DOC rates as a medium custody facility, was given a low medium rating by the consultants because it has all dormitory housing and no single cells. Though medium custody level inmates require limited security and control within an institution with perimeter security, this institution is insufficient to house these inmates.
- The ASPC-Florence East Unit and Tent Unit, which house medium security inmates, were rated as minimum custody facilities because housing units at these facilities cannot be secured. There is no way to isolate disruptive inmates until order can be restored.
- The ASPC-Tucson Rincon Unit, which DOC rated a medium custody facility, was rated as a low medium facility because of deficiencies in control centers, housing units and perimeter security.

Further Action Required
To Improve Security

The Department of Corrections should take additional steps to improve security at its adult institutions. Although the Department has attempted to identify and remedy security deficiencies, other problems have precluded proper focus on security. Moreover, funding has either been unavailable or not requested for some needed security improvements. However, the Department can take immediate action to address some security problems while developing mid-range and long-term plans to ensure that all institutions provide adequate security.

Other Problems Have Precluded Focus On Security - The Department of Corrections should place greater emphasis on security matters. The Department has addressed many security issues and needs. However, other problems have precluded a sufficient focus on security.

Some effort has been made by DOC to address security issues and needs. Most security deficiencies identified during the audit are known to Department officials, and some planning is underway to develop solutions for them. Since 1984 the department has:

- formulated task forces to study security issues which include inmate property, security detection systems, drugs, inmate housing, inmate rewards and punishment systems, inmate identification by custody level, compassionate leave, classification, and inmate grooming;

- conducted on-site facility inspections to look for security problems, with senior security personnel from various institutions inspecting the security situation of areas other than their own;
- inspected institutional armories to determine the adequacy of weapons inventory and storage, ammunition, chemical agents, records, procedures, and key control;
- staged surprise vehicle and visitor inspections with State law enforcement officials to search for illegal contraband such as weapons and drugs;
- conducted surprise institutional searches for contraband; and
- identified dangerous gang inmates to curtail illegal activities.

Because of other problems, Central Office and institutional administrators have been slow to address some of the known security problems. According to the Assistant Director for adult institutions, "it has been difficult for the Department to develop logical and comprehensive plans to address security problems because of other day-to-day pressures encountered running the Department." These include population pressures, overuse of facilities, staff turnover problems, lack of available maximum security cell space, construction projects, development of a new classification system and preparation of the agency budget.

Funding Has Not Been Obtained To Correct Deficiencies - Funding has not been obtained to correct security deficiencies. The Legislature has not granted some funding requests for security projects. Additionally, the Department has never compiled a complete funding request outlining funding needs for security problems.

Auditor General security consultants believe that current conditions are primarily the result of inadequate resources, or the inadequate management of resources, over a long period of time. The Department has been forced to defer action on some needed security improvements at adult institutions due to lack of funding by the Legislature. Seven security improvement projects requested by DOC were not funded for fiscal year 1985-86. The Department requested more than \$866,000 Land, Building and Improvement (LB&I) dollars to enhance perimeter security fencing, security

lighting, electronic locks and fire alarm systems at adult institutions. In addition, during the previous five fiscal years LB&I security improvement requests estimated at \$5.4 million for adult institutions were not funded, according to DOC.* However, the Legislature did appropriate more than \$900,000 for security improvements during this period.

Further, the Department has not fully informed the Legislature of its security problems and the funding needed to correct them. Although some adult institutions have submitted policy issues requesting additional security operations funds, several requests were not included in the Department's budget requests in previous years. These policy issues, which include communications capabilities and equipment, staffing, and other equipment requests, cannot be pursued because no funding has been requested. Department administrators were uncertain why no action was taken.

Security Deficiencies Should Be Addressed Immediately - The Department of Corrections should address its existing security problems. Once these concerns are dealt with the Department can begin to develop plans to meet future security needs.

Several steps can be taken immediately to correct existing security problems.

- The Department needs to assess the extent of its remaining security problems. The Department must take an inventory of security needs and deficiencies, and identify the costs for needed improvements. Auditor General security consultants believe the Department should present the Legislature and Governor with a realistic summary of all security problems and the costs to correct them. Additionally, this summary should include a comprehensive staffing analysis to determine the scope of staffing deficiencies.
- DOC must continue to expand its efforts to see that policies and procedures are adhered to. Further, the Department should

* Some projects that were not funded when initially requested were included in subsequent years' requests. The amounts cited do not include repeat requests.

reevaluate and rewrite some policies and procedures. Those needing attention include inmate counts, tool control, medication and visitation policies.

Once these tasks are accomplished the Department can evaluate and upgrade its current facility master plans to meet future needs (see Finding III). Future facility expansion plans should include the replacement of temporary housing structures which pose security risks. Auditor General security consultants believe that a realistic, cost effective master plan to guide the development of future facilities is essential to avoid occurrences of security deficiencies.

CONCLUSION

Security deficiencies at prison facilities jeopardize public safety as well as institutional control. Perimeter security problems and security deficiencies within institutions have resulted in some facilities being inappropriate to house the offenders incarcerated within. The Department's focus on other problems and lack of funding has weakened security. The Department should begin immediately to resolve security deficiencies. In addition, the Department should develop long-range plans and upgrade its facility master plans.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The State Department of Corrections should consider the following steps to improve institutional security. DOC should immediately:
 - a. Inventory perimeter and internal security needs and deficiencies, correct those that can be addressed immediately, and request adequate funding from the Legislature to address the remaining deficiencies.
 - b. Conduct a comprehensive staffing analysis to determine the scope of security staffing deficiencies. This study should review various post requirements as well as variations in work requirements and work load.

- c. Revise and implement changes to some of its policies and procedures to reduce risks to visitors, staff and inmates. These include inmate counts, tool control, dispensing of medication and visitation policies.
2. DOC should evaluate and upgrade its current facility master plan to meet future needs. The plan should include replacing temporary housing structures which pose security risks.

FINDING II

THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY CONTROL CONTRABAND

Contraband is widespread and easily accessible within Arizona prisons. The Arizona Department of Corrections (DOC) has not effectively prevented contraband from entering the facilities nor have adequate controls been maintained on sources of contraband within the institutions. Moreover, the Department's efforts to control contraband are limited.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons defines contraband as material prohibited by law or by regulation, or material that can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the security, safety or good order of the institution. Contraband control is important because contraband such as drugs combined with access to machines to fabricate weapons and tools can create a severe security hazard for an institution or complex. Monthly activity reports maintained by DOC's Inspections and Investigations Unit as well as logs maintained by the various institutions indicate the widespread existence of contraband within the institutions.

DOC Does Not Adequately Restrict Contraband From Entering The Institutions

The Department of Corrections has not effectively prevented contraband from entering its institutions. Although visitation increases contraband, DOC does not adequately control visitation to prohibit contraband from entering institutions. In addition, the Department's efforts to detect contraband have been limited.

Visitation Increases Contraband - A Department of Corrections investigator estimates that 75 percent of contraband enters through visitation. His estimate is supported by the amount of contraband discovered entering institutions during a limited number of surprise searches conducted at various institutions this year.

During these searches, employees as well as visitors have been discovered

with contraband in their possession. For example, during the vehicle and person search conducted at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Perryville on March 16, 1985, 12 employees and 96 visitors were found to be in possession of contraband. Items uncovered included marijuana, alcohol and firearms.

Visitation Is Not Adequately Controlled - Although visitation is a source of contraband, adequate controls to prevent visitors from bringing unauthorized items into institutions are not evident at many Arizona prisons. Although most institutions have post orders that emphasize monitoring of visitation activities, staff observation of visitation is minimal. In addition, current food and open yard practices increase the potential for contraband to enter the institutions.

Visitation is not adequately monitored by DOC staff. Insufficient monitoring and observation of visitation by DOC staff increases the opportunity to pass contraband unnoticed. Contrary to DOC policy, petting, prolonged kissing and embracing occurred at most of the institutions visited by Auditor General staff. Prolonged physical contact between inmates and visitors enhances the possibility of contraband being passed unnoticed.* Our observation of visitation indicated that staff observation is minimal. The consultants from N.R. Cox also noted this problem.

- ASPC-T Santa Rita staff reported to the consultants that on the day prior to their visit a sexual encounter between a female visitor and an inmate occurred in the visiting strip search room. No staff were available to supervise the visitors in the visiting room. In addition, no staff were observing visitation the day the consultants were there.
- At ASPC-P Santa Cruz an inmate walked right into the visitation area without being observed because the correctional service officer (CSO) responsible for checking inmates in had been called away from his post.

* The DOC policy statement in effect at the time of our visits, #302.5, clearly states: "Inmates and Visitors may embrace at the beginning and end of a visit only. SEXUAL CONTACT IS PROHIBITED. Petting, prolonged kissing or prolonged embracing is not permitted." (Emphasis in original)

In addition, some institutions do not adequately search food items. Allowing food items to be brought during visitation increases the potential for contraband to enter an institution. Perryville, Florence, Tucson and Fort Grant complexes allow visitors to bring food into at least one of their units. Observation of visitation at units revealed that large ice chests and bags of food were brought in by many of the visitors. Although these items were searched, Auditor General staff observed that the searches were less than thorough. For example, one large ice chest was brought in filled to the top with ice. All that was visible were two cans of pop. The lid of the ice chest was merely opened and then closed by the CSO inspecting the food items.

Furthermore, open yard visitation appears to increase the opportunities for contraband to be brought into an institution. According to DOC, open yard visitation allows inmates, their friends and families to participate in activities on the athletic field such as sports, picnics, etc., that cannot be pursued in a visitation room environment. Open yard visitation occurs at three of the units at various times throughout the year. Open yards are harder to control and monitor because visitors and inmates are not confined in an enclosed area.

On July 13, 1985, Auditor General staff and their consultants observed the open yard visitation at ASPC-F South Unit and noted several problems that could contribute to increased contraband within the unit. At the time Auditor General staff entered the yard, inmates and visitors were spread out across an athletic yard the size of a football field. Many inmates and visitors were well concealed by large beach-type umbrellas. Violations of visitation policies and procedures prohibiting petting and prolonged embracing and kissing between visitors and inmates were evident. The concealment and personal contact provide opportunity for introducing contraband. A CSO commented that the unit has a lot of problems with inmates who are drunk or high for a few days after an open yard visit. Furthermore, the large quantity of drug contraband discovered during the following week by the Inspections and Investigations search team in ASPC-F South Unit was attributed to the open yard held the previous Saturday.

Efforts To Detect Contraband Are Limited - The Department's efforts to detect contraband appear insufficient. Security devices to detect contraband are frequently broken or nonexistent. Because frisk or pat searches are not routinely conducted on visitors as an alternative to mechanical screening, the possibility of metal contraband entering the institution is increased. In addition, surprise vehicle and person searches have been limited.

Auditor General staff and the consultants noted instances of inoperable and nonexistent detection equipment. For example:

- As of July 11, 1985, Alhambra's metal detector had been inoperable for more than a month. This detector was also out of commission at the time of a visit by Auditor General staff in March 1985.
- ASPC-T Rincon Unit staff use a hand scanner because they are never sure when their metal detector is working.
- ASPC-F North Unit Outside Trustee (NUOT) does not have any metal detection equipment and therefore, does not routinely submit visitors to any search of their person. Only items brought in by visitors are subjected to search. This contrasts with ASPC-Perryville where all visitors are scanned with a metal detector.

Even in the absence of operational metal detectors, visitors have not been pat searched unless there is reason to believe they are concealing contraband. As a result, metal contraband could be brought into the institutions undetected. None of the institutions observed by Auditor General staff conducted pat searches on visitors. According to a DOC official, the Department can pat or even strip search visitors however, it has to be consistent to safeguard against harrassment charges. For example, DOC could use some systematic selection process such as searching everyone or every fourth person.

Despite their demonstrated potential for restricting the flow of contraband from the outside, the surprise vehicle and person searches conducted by Inspections and Investigations (I&I) have been limited. As of September 9, 1985, only five searches had been conducted in a

six-month period. In addition, the searches were only conducted on weekends.*

DOC Lacks Sufficient Controls On Sources
Of Contraband Within The Institutions

Sources of contraband within Arizona's prisons are poorly controlled. Staff and inmates rarely follow tool control procedures, and the Department lacks sufficient functional detection equipment to identify contraband. Medical and pharmaceutical items are not adequately controlled or monitored by staff. In addition, inmates entering institutions are not routinely searched. Furthermore, actual search practices are ineffective.

Poor Tool Control - DOC fails to adequately maintain tool control within its institutions. The widespread availability of tools indicates that the Department's tool control policies and the procedures are poorly implemented. In addition, metal detectors are either inoperative or nonexistent resulting in further lack of control.

Inmates can acquire tools within the Department's institutions. These tools can be turned into weapons or aid in an escape attempt. For example, saws, drills, welding equipment and hacksaw blades are available in the ASPC-F Central Unit ARCOR industrial yard. More than 100 tools were confiscated at ASPC-Florence by DOC's Inspections and Investigations Unit in 1984. Table 3 on Page 24 identifies the tools seized at ASPC-Florence.

* According to the Assistant Director of I&I, overtime costs plus increased caseloads prohibit conducting more of these searches. In addition, the element of surprise would be diminished if the searches were conducted too frequently.

TABLE 3

TOOL CONTRABAND CONFISCATED IN ASPC-FLORENCE IN 1984⁽¹⁾

wire cutters	34	router	1
hacksaw blade	38	metal tape measure	21
screwdriver	38	wrench	5
file	8	razor knife	2
drill	4	circular saw	1
chisel	5	soldering gun	1
hammer	8	shears	2
belt sander	1	barber shears	2

(1) This report covers only items uncovered at ASPC-Florence and only those that were discovered by the I&I search team in Florence.

American Correctional Association (ACA) standard #2-4197 considers a written policy and procedure addressing tool control essential.* According to the ACA:

"Tools and utensils such as hacksaws, welding equipment, butcher knives and barber shears can cause death or serious injury. They should be locked in control panels and issued in accordance with a prescribed system. Provision should be made for checking tools and utensils in and out, and for the control of their use at all times."

The Department of Corrections has a written policy on tool control that meets the intent of the ACA standard. However observation of areas requiring tool control indicated that this policy is not followed. DOC's policy #408 on tool control dated April 19, 1980, states:

"It is the policy of the Department of Corrections that tools, flammable, toxic and caustic materials be maintained in secure areas inaccessible to inmates, that provisions be made to ensure supervision of their use and that a prescribed system be used to account for their distribution."

* The American Correctional Association develops standards that provide correctional administrators with the opportunity to develop a planned program for upgrading facilities and procedures in accordance with a nationally recognized format.




ILLUSTRATION 1--Contraband discovered in the ASPC-Florence-Central Unit (Maximum Security)




ILLUSTRATION 2--Contraband discovered in the ASPC-Tucson-Santa Rita Unit (Medium Security)

Although DOC's Internal Inspections Section reports indicate that most institutions are in compliance with DOC policy #408, numerous examples of unsecured or unattended tools, equipment, and toxic and flammable materials were observed. The following examples indicate that institutions are not in compliance with DOC policy #408.

- The consultants observed that the hobby shop area in ASPC-F Central Unit maximum custody cellblock 2 has no general method to control the issuance of tools. Each inmate owns his own tools and these tools are kept in wooden cabinets. The inmates control access to these cabinets. There was no inventory of these tools as of July 13, 1985.
- An unsecured portable acetylene welding torch was observed in the maximum custody ASPC-F Central Unit maintenance shop by the consultants.
- We found little tool control at ASPC-F NUOT. NUOT's procedure #315.0 indicates that all tools will be logged and inventoried, however, NUOT has no master list of tools. An inventory cannot be taken when there is no list of the number and type of tools to inventory. The inmate responsible for the control of these tools was unaware of any DOC policy or procedure on tool control.
- Staff do not control or inventory equipment and tools for an inmate operated TV repair business in the ASPC-P San Juan Unit. The consultants noted that the inmate makes his own purchases and maintains his own tools, equipment and supplies.
- Tools were unsecured at the ARCOR building at ASPC-Perryville. Wire cutters, long shears, files, etc. were observed in an unlocked cabinet. There was no supervision in the area. Our consultants took several of these items and left the grounds with them. Ten days later the tools had not been reported missing.
- Tool control and supervision was nonexistent in the facility maintenance shop at ASPC-T Santa Rita. Unsupervised inmates had access to all the tools and equipment. Pipe cutters, files and cutting pliers were observed in an unlocked cabinet.
- ASPC-Phoenix Flamenco's construction supervisor was unaware of any DOC tool control policies or procedures. Two inmates who work the tool room are the only ones with keys to it. Auditor General staff observed five to ten hacksaw blades hanging loose on a board, and we were informed that these aren't inventoried because they are a consumable item.
- It is possible to throw tools and other items over the wall from the industrial yard into the main yard in the maximum custody ASPC-F Central Unit. Auditor General staff and their security

consultants threw a mallet over the wall into the Central Unit and when it was thrown back over into the industrial yard it landed next to an axe that was concealed in the grass.

- A broken window in an inmate operated business area at ASPC-F Central Unit may contribute to the flow of contraband. This window looks directly on the Central Unit yard. According to the consultants, it would be possible, and is very likely, that tools or homemade knives are produced in this area and passed through the broken window to other inmates.

Compliance with tool control procedures is more difficult when inmates have direct access with little supervision. Insufficient staff requires DOC to rely on inmates to supplement its maintenance staff. The consultants are of the opinion that a large number of the procedural and operational problems within the Department are due to insufficient staff resources.

Although metal detectors enhance tool control, the Department has failed to adequately maintain detection equipment to control contraband in several areas, and lacks detection equipment in other areas. DOC has numerous instances of inoperable or nonexistent metal detection equipment as the following examples indicate.

- ASPC-Phoenix Flamenco does not possess any metal detection equipment. Currently under construction, Flamenco houses minimum security inmates who have daily access to tools.
- The metal detectors for checking inmates leaving for work assignments or returning from the ARCOR industrial yard were not operational in the maximum custody ASPC-F Central Unit.
- The metal detector at the pedestrian sally port leading from the ASPC-F South Unit to the ARCOR industrial yard was not operational at the time of our consultants' visit.
- ASPC-P Santa Cruz Unit has a metal detector in the vocational area, but it was inoperable at the time of our visit.
- Access from the ARCOR area at the ASPC-T Rincon Unit was not controlled. There is no metal detector to screen prisoners reentering the compound.
- Alhambra's metal detector was not operable at the time of our visit.

- ASPC-F East Unit has no metal detectors for inmates returning from vocational areas or the ARCOR mattress factory.

Medical And Pharmaceutical Supplies Are Not Adequately Monitored - DOC does not adequately control medical and pharmaceutical items. ACA standard #2-4317 mandates a written policy and procedure providing for the proper management of pharmaceuticals. However, no written, consistent policy is evident for recording or inventorying medical supplies and specifically controlled substances.

- Medical supplies are not secured at the ASPC-Perryville complex pharmacy. A weekly medical supply is kept in an unsecured metal storage cabinet located in a treatment room. On the days of the consultants' visit and the audit staff visit this cabinet was unlocked and open. Anyone could reach in and take the medication.
- A pharmacist at the ASPC-F Central Unit responsible for preparing prescription medication did not know how inventory records were kept at the facility.
- An open box of syringes was observed in a supply room at Alhambra where an unsupervised resident inmate was attempting to repair a compressor. When the inventory clerk was questioned she indicated that she would not know if a needle were missing or not.

Extortion, assaults and unmanageable inmates may develop as a direct result of drug availability. At ASPC-F NUOT an inmate was found to be in possession of 18 Tylenol III tablets (codeine). It was believed that this inmate stole the tablets from the pharmacy where he was a porter. The inmate admitted intent to sell the tablets to other inmates. A second inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle Tylenol tablets into the ASPC-F South Unit, also thought to be stolen from the pharmacy. In addition, the security consultants strongly advise against DOC's practice of dispensing weekly doses of drugs to some inmates (see Finding I, page 12).

Inmates Entering Institutions Not Properly Searched - Inmates are sometimes allowed to enter an institution, either from another institution or from outside an institution, without being searched. Consequently, inmates may bring contraband into an institution unchecked. Observation of institution sally ports by Auditor General

staff and the consultants demonstrated the potential for inmates to bring contraband into an institution.

- Minimum security level inmates working outside the Alhambra perimeter were not searched either by machine or by hand before entering the main yard of the Alhambra maximum security institution. These inmates were arriving from a maintenance shop where they had access to tools. These minimum security inmates mingle with maximum security inmates within the Alhambra institution.
- The consultants observed that no searches were conducted on an unsupervised medium security inmate at ASPC-Tucson. This inmate was working on a construction project outside the unit perimeter but inside the complex perimeter. The inmate was permitted to enter and leave the ASPC-T Santa Rita Unit through the vehicular gate without being searched.

Search Practices Are Ineffective - Current institutional search practices fail to control contraband. The extensive presence of contraband indicates that thorough contraband searches are not routinely conducted.

Regular searches are necessary to: 1) prevent the introduction and possession of weapons or other dangerous contraband in institutions; 2) detect the manufacture of weapons, escape devices, etc. within an institution; 3) discover and suppress trafficking between employees and inmates; 4) discourage theft and trafficking in institutional stores; and 5) discover hazards to health or safety that may go unnoticed during a more routine inspection. ACA standards recommend searches. According to ACA:

"the control of weapons and contraband in an adult correctional institution is a security measure. The institution's search plans and procedures should include the following: Unannounced and irregularly timed searches of cells, inmates, and inmate work areas; frequent search and careful supervision of inmate trustees; use of metal detectors at compound gates and entrances into cell blocks; and complete search and inspection of each cell prior to occupancy by a new inmate."

Auditor General consultants strongly endorse this policy. According to the consultants, security searches of inmate housing and other activity

areas should be conducted regularly, and they recommend that each institution have its own search team to conduct regular searches and security checks.

The Department's search efforts to control contraband appear inadequate. Only one DOC facility, ASPC-T Santa Rita, has a designated full-time search team, however its efforts have been limited. This search team is staffed by two CSOs from the unit who conduct searches in the facility. The search team conducts cell, inmate and common area searches at Santa Rita, and performs investigative work. This search team was organized in March 1985 by the unit warden in an effort to control contraband. No staff were budgeted for these positions, therefore staff were pulled from other areas of the unit. However, the team has been temporarily disbanded for the second time since its inception as the result of lack of staff to fulfill the search duties. In addition, the search team's log book indicates that the search team is utilized for transporting inmates, supervising work crews and other nonsearch related functions.

The Inspections and Investigations Unit's search team based at ASPC-Florence cannot effectively provide searches for all State institutions. It is staffed by four officers and a narcotics dog.* This search team conducts shakedowns and special searches for all the units in the Florence complex. The surprise searches of visitors, employees and vehicles entering DOC grounds are also conducted by this unit. This is also a Statewide search team, therefore, searches at other institutions are conducted upon request. However, the search team has conducted only 13 searches at other institutions. The search team believes that traveling across the State to conduct searches for other institutions is an inefficient use of its time. Separate institutional search teams could alleviate this inefficiency.

* DOC has only one narcotics dog, which it acquired on an experimental basis. According to I&I personnel, the dog has been effective in finding drugs. The Department has not determined whether it will purchase more narcotic dogs.

The remaining three institutions visited have no full-time designated search teams and use various approaches to conduct searches. ASPC-Phoenix has recently designated and trained personnel to conduct searches as a team. However, the search activities would take the CSOs away from their regular duties. This team does not conduct searches on a daily basis. ASPC-Perryville and ASP-Fort Grant rely on unit CSOs to conduct random cell searches along with their routine duties. Although most of the institutions indicated that they do perform thorough searches on a regular basis, designated search team CSOs believe that most unit CSOs don't have the time to conduct thorough searches. In fact, NUOT CSOs at Florence do not conduct room searches on a regular basis because of staff shortages. Room searches are conducted only upon probable cause. ASPC-P Santa Maria Unit conducted only 24 cell searches in the three months of March through May. An I&I inspector from the Central Office believes that sufficient staff are not available at the institutions to conduct thorough contraband searches, and our consultants agree.

Efforts To Control Contraband Are Limited

DOC's efforts to control contraband are limited. The Department's control of contraband may be limited by Departmental policies and facilities. Even when contraband is found DOC's options for punishing inmates are limited. In addition, DOC may lack the necessary staff to effectively control contraband.

Policies May Promote Contraband Movement - The Department of Corrections' control over contraband may be limited by certain policies. The commingling of inmates of various custody levels may help the movement of contraband through the system. In addition, allowable inmate property appears excessive.

DOC allows inmates of different custody levels to come into contact with each other. This may adversely affect contraband control because lower custody level inmates have greater freedom and increased access to areas where contraband may be obtained.

- Medical facilities at ASPC-Florence and ASPC-Tucson provide medical treatment for all prisoners in each complex. Therefore, different custody level inmates have the opportunity to come in contact with each other.
- The ASPC-F Special Programs Unit treats substance abuse inmates and mentally ill inmates of all custody levels. According to our consultants, the former drug abusers are probably predators on the mentally ill, who are on medication and are obviously victims. In the consultants' opinion, mixing these two groups in this facility creates an enormous liability for the State Department of Corrections.

Inmates are allowed to accumulate large amounts of personal property within institutions, which makes searches for contraband extremely difficult. An April 1985 task force report indentified that DOC lacked a clear policy regarding inmate property. This report indicates that inmates are allowed to possess too much property. This is substantiated by DOC's current inmate property policy, #420, dated November 21, 1980, which does not limit the amount of property an inmate can have.* The consultants found a number of examples of excess personal property throughout the institutions. For example, two vans were needed to transport 100 boxes of personal property for 13 inmates relocated to Florence from Perryville.

Facilities May Affect Contraband Control - Facility placement and design may hinder contraband control. The following examples illustrate the potential for contraband to be passed within the institutions as a result of the the design and placement of buildings.

- According to the consultants, the design and placement of the visitation strip search room at ASPC-F South Unit could hamper the unit's attempt to control contraband. A connecting door between the inmate strip room and the toilet area used by inmates in the visiting room has approximately a one inch gap between the floor and the bottom of the door. Inmates could pass contraband under the door.
- The strip search area at ASPC-T Tent City is not a secured area that is free from contraband. The consultants observed that inmates are strip searched in the toilet area used during visitation at Tent City. It is possible for an inmate to hide

* The Department is in the process of revising the inmate property policy to limit the amount of property allowed.

contraband in the inmate toilet during the visiting period and pick it up later. A visitor could hide contraband in the visiting area or merely throw it into the compound to be picked up later. It would not be difficult, once the contraband is in this unit, to transport it into the Rincon Unit.

- Visitors must be bused from visitor control to each unit at the ASPC-T and ASPC-Perryville complexes. The transportation vehicles are operated by inmates who may handle, hide and deliver contraband.

DOC's Ability To Punish Inmates For Contraband Possession Limited - The Department of Corrections is limited in its ability to punish inmates for contraband violations. Court prosecutions are hindered due to difficulty in establishing proof of possession. In addition, institutional disciplinary actions are limited due to overcrowding and inadequate lockup facilities.

The inability of prosecutors to establish possession is a major obstacle to prosecuting inmates for contraband violations. When inmates are housed in close proximity to each other it is difficult to prove a contraband case because it could be argued that another inmate placed the contraband. Therefore, the practice of double bunking and dormitory type housing restricts the Department's ability to criminally prosecute inmates for possession of contraband through the court system, which could lengthen the inmate's sentence time.

The Department of Corrections has the authority to handle inmate discipline violations as an institutional disciplinary matter, however penalties are limited due to overcrowding and inadequate lockup facilities. Inmates can receive various types of penalties for contraband violations, ranging from a reprimand to isolation.* Isolation is a severe penalty. However, the lack of isolation cells restricts DOC from using this harsh penalty as a disciplinary punishment (see Other Pertinent Information, page 56).

* Other penalty options are loss of good time earned, loss of eligibility for parole, extra work detail, and loss of store or other privileges.

Staffing May Be Insufficient - There are not enough guards to adequately control and supervise inmates and their activities. As a result, efforts to control contraband may be hindered (see Finding I, page 5).

CONCLUSION

Contraband is prevalent within the Department of Corrections' institutions. Contraband has not been kept from the institutions. In addition, adequate controls are not maintained on sources of contraband within the institutions. Furthermore, DOC's efforts to control contraband have been limited.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department of Corrections should further restrict contraband from entering the institutions by:
 - a. Better enforcing visitation policies and procedures.
 - b. Repairing and maintaining metal detection equipment, and purchasing metal detectors for those institutions that currently have none.
 - c. Searching all inmates before they enter institutions.
 - d. Reviewing the open yard visitation practice and its potential impact on contraband control. If open yards are allowed to continue, more staff should be allocated for observation, and visitation policies and procedures should be enforced.
 - e. Reviewing the Department's policy and the institutions' procedures regarding food being brought in.
 - f. Continuing and increasing the surprise vehicle searches by I&I.

2. The Department should increase its control over sources of contraband within the institutions by:
 - a. Informing staff of tool control policies and procedures, ensuring that tools and equipment are inventoried regularly, and reviewing tool control policies and procedures annually.
 - b. Reviewing DOC policies and procedures on inmate operated businesses and hobby shops for control measures. Specifically, tools and equipment should be inventoried regularly.
 - c. Implementing policies and procedures regarding the control of pharmaceutical and medical supplies. The Department should contact the State Board of Pharmacy for assistance in developing a record-keeping and inventory system for uniform application in all institutions within the system.
 - d. Reviewing for legal ramifications the current practice of mixing various custody levels of inmates in the Special Programs Unit.
 - e. Developing and utilizing search teams at other facilities to conduct regular searches.
 - f. Reviewing and revising the Department's inmate property policy to decrease the amount of personal property allowed to inmates.
 - g. Planning for additional lockup cells for disciplinary purposes in order to deter contraband and other violations.

FINDING III

THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MISCLASSIFIES ADULT INMATES, WHICH INCREASES SECURITY RISKS

The Department of Corrections' (DOC) inmate classification system does not properly classify adult male inmates. Inmate underclassification increases security risks by placing higher risk inmates in lower security facilities. Misclassification occurs because DOC uses a subjective classification system and has an overcrowded prison system.

Proper inmate classification is essential for safe and orderly prison operations.* The classification process determines inmates' needs and risk potential and assigns them to housing units and programs according to these needs and risks, and existing Departmental resources.** Classification in Arizona occurs throughout an inmate's incarceration period and is performed by classification committees. Newly committed inmates complete a two to three week diagnostic and classification period, which determines each inmate's custody level (supervision required) and institutional assignment. Periodic reclassification actions at the inmate's resident institution determine whether an inmate's custody level or institutional assignment need to be changed. Central Office Classification reviews for approval both initial and reclassification committee recommendations. Criteria determining inmate custody include sentence length, offense, criminal and escape history, outstanding detainers, and behavioral adjustment. Current custody levels are administrative segregation, maximum, medium, minimum and trusty/community.

DOC Misclassification Increases Security Risks And Causes Other Problems

The Department misclassifies inmates, causing increased security risks and other problems. Some maximum custody inmates are underclassified and

* Classification As A Management Tool: Theories and Models for Decisionmakers, American Correctional Association, 1982, p. 6.

** Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Second Edition, American Correctional Association, January, 1981, p. 126.

placed in lower custody facilities than warranted by their degree of risk. In addition, security is inadequate at some facilities, which further increases misclassification risks. Unnecessary costs and inmate restrictions also occur because some inmates are overclassified when entering the system.

Maximum Custody Inmates In Lower Custody Levels - DOC's current classification system underclassifies some adult male inmates. During reclassification a substantial number of maximum custody inmates are inappropriately classified as minimum or medium custody. The most serious of these instances involve placing maximum custody inmates in minimum custody facilities. A random sample shows that more than 6 percent of the inmates (21 of 339 inmates sampled) in minimum custody or lower would be assigned to maximum custody by the Federal Prison System (FPS) Custody Determination Instrument.* This is a serious underclassification problem in that inmates are placed two custody levels below that warranted for their needs and risks.


Cumulatively, the sample shows that DOC assigns nearly 18 percent of the inmates to maximum custody, while the Federal model places nearly 31 percent in that custody level. Inappropriately assigning inmates to lower custody facilities presents considerable danger within the institutions and to the general public. Underclassification can contribute to serious disciplinary infractions, suicide or other institutional violence because

* The Auditor General's Office contracted with Correctional Services Group, Inc., a correctional consulting firm, to assess the DOC inmate classification system. The consultant selected the FPS Custody Classification Instrument to compare the results of DOC classification decisions to those of FPS, using a statistically valid, randomly selected sample of 339 adult male Arizona inmates. The FPS Custody Determination Instrument was chosen by the consultants for this analysis because it is an objectively based model. The FPS instrument has been validated and the courts have accepted it as a valid tool in assessing misclassification. Although the Federal model has not been validated for Arizona, it's documented validity as a classification system and the large difference in results from Arizona's present system strongly indicate that DOC has underclassified a substantial number of inmates.

inmates are housed in lower security environments than warranted. Public risk also increases because underclassification can lead to inmate escape. Figure 1 demonstrates maximum security underclassification during reclassification.

FIGURE 1

COMPARISON OF DOC AND FPS CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS
ON ADULT MALE INMATES DURING RECLASSIFICATION



- (1) Differences in administrative segregation results were insignificant and are not included. Therefore, figures will total less than 100 percent.
- (2) Minimum includes minimum custody, community correctional and trusty status.

Source: Compiled by Auditor General staff from Correctional Services Group, Inc. classification report, pages 18-19*

Inadequate Facility Security Increases Risks - Security risks resulting from misclassifications are further increased by DOC's inadequate facility security. Security consultants retained by the Auditor General determined that many DOC facilities are less secure than the current designations

* The Correctional Services Group, Inc. classification report, Analysis of the Arizona DOC Offender Classification System, August 1985, is available for review at the Office of the Arizona Auditor General.


indicate (see Finding I, page 13). For example, two medium facilities were rated only minimum by the security consultants. In addition, DOC uses the Alhambra adult male reception center, as a maximum custody facility but security consultants rate it as minimum custody. Thus, a maximum security inmate classified as medium may actually be housed in an institution that provides only minimum security because of security deficiencies.

Initial Overclassification - Although DOC underclassifies many inmates as they progress through the system, the consultant's analysis showed that DOC overclassifies many inmates during initial classification. While not posing a security risk, this results in unnecessary costs and inmate restrictions. At initial classification the Department assigned 58 percent of the adult male sample to medium custody, while FPS criteria assigned approximately 21 percent of inmates in the same sample to that custody level.* These overclassifications increase DOC's costs by inappropriately placing inmates in higher security level facilities which require increased physical and structural security, and more operating staff. Figure 2 illustrates overclassification occurring during initial classification.

* Medium custody overclassification is also high during reclassification, with the difference between the FPS and DOC systems reduced to 28 percent. In addition, the FPS instrument assigned 9 inmates of the sample to minimum custody while DOC placed them in maximum custody.

FIGURE 2

COMPARISON OF DOC AND FPS CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS
ON ADULT MALE INMATES DURING INITIAL CLASSIFICATION



- (1) Differences in administrative segregation results were insignificant and were not included. Therefore, figures will total less than 100 percent.
- (2) Minimum includes minimum custody, community correctional and trusty status.

Source: Compiled by Auditor General staff from Correctional Services Group, Inc. report, pages 15 and 16

Overclassification may also result in violations of certain inmate constitutional rights. A recent Federal court decision has held that excessive restrictive confinement is considered cruel and unusual punishment.* By overclassifying inmates DOC may be violating that decision and exposing itself to prisoner lawsuits.

* Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122 (1979)

Subjective Classification Process, Overcrowded Facilities, And Inaccessible Prison Gang Information Cause Misclassification

The current classification process combined with overcrowded institutions causes misclassification. DOC uses an inadequate subjective classification system in assigning inmates a custody level designation and institution. However, even if the system were more objective, overcrowding would still limit DOC's ability to place inmates appropriately. Further, prison gang information important for proper classification is not easily accessible.

Current Classification System Is Subjective - Currently DOC uses a subjective classification decision-making process. DOC's system is subjective, rather than objective, because it lacks a formal decision-making model. Although DOC has custody placement policy and employs a nationally recognized psychological and skills test, results are not weighted or considered in a structured manner. DOC recognizes that its current classification system is inadequate, and recently began development of an objective system. The Department allocated \$50,000 and established time frames for the project. Federal funds (from the NIC) have been requested to support the project. DOC plans to develop and implement the classification model by January 3, 1986. Our classification consultant states that system validation ensuring proper performance should occur within 12 to 18 months after implementation.

Overcrowded Prison System Contributes To Misclassification - Even if Arizona's classification system were objective, the currently overcrowded prison system would continue to contribute to prisoner misclassification. Arizona's adult prison population exceeds prison capacity by approximately 25 percent of permanent capacity, although use of temporary bed facilities such as tents and quonset huts has reduced overcrowding to about 1 percent. Regardless, a national correctional expert has noted that "once a system hits 90 percent capacity, classification falls apart."* Reduced

* "Objective Classification . . . A Catalyst for Change," Corrections Magazine, S. Gettinger, June 1982, p. 33.

flexibility regarding institutional placement occurs when prison systems are over capacity. This often results in inmates being placed wherever beds are available.* A valid, objective classification system, however, would ensure that inmates with the greatest security risks would be assigned to the most secure institutions.

Maximum custody beds are currently in highest demand and DOC has the least flexibility in assigning maximum custody inmates (see Finding IV, page 50). Approximately one-third of the Department's 932 maximum beds have been used for protective custody inmate housing. DOC has begun to address this problem by recently transferring 93 inmates from the Central Unit maximum custody area to a medium security unit at Perryville.

Prison Gang Information Is Not Readily Accessible - Important classification information relating to prison gangs is not readily accessible, and this may contribute to misclassification. Currently, inmate files include little gang affiliation information. Although classification staff have access to this information, communication procedures between Intelligence and Investigations (I&I) gang intelligence staff and classification staff are lacking. This has reduced accessibility to this information. As a consequence, inmates may have been inappropriately assigned to institutions and thus subjected to physical injury and intimidation. For example, an inmate was recently beaten with a pipe and killed within two to three hours of his arrival at a new institution. This inmate was believed to be the victim of gang retaliation. Classification staff transferred this inmate unaware that he was a gang member possibly targeted for retaliation. DOC classification staff, I&I gang intelligence staff and the consultant believe that inmate files should include nonconfidential gang affiliation information.

* The classification consultant noted a relationship between DOC's current bed space distribution by custody level and its classification recommendations. This is apparently a result of DOC's need to use available beds, which limits its capability to effectively match an inmate's needs with the Department's resources.

CONCLUSION

The Department of Corrections' adult inmate classification system misclassifies inmates. Underclassified inmates increase security risks. Overclassification results in unnecessary costs and inmate restrictions. DOC's current subjective classification process and overcrowded prison system cause misclassification.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOC should continue to develop and implement an objective inmate classification system.
2. DOC should objectively classify all institutions and units in terms of security and program capabilities.
3. DOC should include nonconfidential gang affiliation information in inmate record files.

FINDING IV

THE CURRENT CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM WILL NOT PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH ENOUGH MAXIMUM CUSTODY BEDS

The Department of Corrections (DOC) will not have enough maximum custody beds to securely confine present or future adult male inmates. As previously discussed in Finding III, the Department underclassifies inmates who should be in maximum custody partly because the Department does not have enough maximum custody beds to house these inmates. The Department's present construction program will not provide enough maximum custody beds to meet either current or future needs. DOC needs to begin addressing this critical shortage.

The Department Lacks Maximum Custody Beds

The Department does not have enough maximum custody beds to securely house its current adult male inmate population. Our consultant's analysis indicates that the Department currently needs an additional 1,400 maximum custody beds. In addition, DOC may lack enough minimum custody beds.

Maximum Bed Shortfall - According to our calculations based on the classification consultant's analysis, DOC needs more maximum custody beds.* Analysis indicates that DOC currently needs more than 2,400

* The consultant's findings are based on the use of the Federal Prison System (FPS) classification model. This model is an objective system that has been validated for the FPS population. Because of differences between Arizona and Federal inmate populations the Federal model may not be completely valid for Arizona. However, its documented validity as a classification system and the large difference in results from Arizona's present system strongly indicate that DOC will find that it lacks sufficient maximum custody beds when it begins using an objective classification system. The numbers presented in this finding are used to illustrate the magnitude of the differences between DOC's current system and an objective system. The actual results of DOC's new system may differ in detail from the FPS model, but will very likely show a substantial increase in the number of maximum custody inmates over the current DOC classification system.

maximum custody beds. However, DOC has only 972 maximum beds. Thus, DOC should have at least an additional 1,400 maximum beds. This lack of maximum beds causes some inmates requiring this custody level to be housed in lower custody institutions, thus increasing security risks to the public, Departmental staff and other inmates. Table 4 shows what custody level DOC housing should consist of under the Federal Prison System (FPS) Custody Determination Instrument classification model.

TABLE 4
CURRENT ADULT MALE INMATE BED SPACE REQUIREMENTS

<u>Custody Level</u>	<u>Current Operating Capacity</u> (1)	<u>FPS Model Housing Requirements</u>	<u>Bed Surplus/ (Shortage)</u>
Minimum	2,818	3,987	(1,169)
Medium	3,798(2)	1,283	2,515
Maximum	972(3)	2,406	(1,434)
Administrative Segregation	<u>180</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>88</u>
Total	<u>7,768</u>	<u>7,768</u>	<u>0</u>

(1) Includes 1,541 temporary beds. Permanent adult male inmate bed capacity is 6,227. Reception and juvenile beds are not included in permanent housing available.

(2) Includes 168 mental health and substance abuse beds.

(3) Includes 40 mental health beds.

Source: Compiled by Auditor General staff using Correctional Services Group, Inc. report, pages 32 through 34, and DOC Bed Capacity Report, updated September 1985

Lack of Minimum Security Beds - In addition to insufficient numbers of maximum custody beds, DOC may also lack enough minimum beds. As shown in Table 4, the consultant's analysis indicates that the State prison system needs another 1,000 minimum beds. However, DOC could, with little cost and effort, modify several existing medium security facilities for minimum use.

Current Construction Program Will Not
Provide Enough Maximum Beds When Completed

The Department's current construction program will not provide enough maximum custody beds to meet either current or future adult male inmate custody requirements. Our analysis also indicates that DOC will build too many medium custody beds and not enough minimum custody beds.

Current Construction Will Not Provide Enough Maximum Beds - Even after the current construction program is completed DOC will lack enough maximum custody beds. By the completion of the current construction program in March 1987, DOC will have more than 2,700 maximum inmates, in part because of inmate population growth.* The construction program will only provide an additional 768 maximum beds beyond the existing 972 beds, leaving the Department still lacking 1,000 maximum beds. Using the Department's conservative estimate of \$45,000 per bed to construct maximum custody beds, an additional \$45 million of construction would be required to build enough additional maximum custody beds to meet classification custody requirements by March 1987.

* All calculations are based on November 1985 Department of Administration-Correctional Facilities Planning and Construction Division estimated completion date for the current construction program. The Douglas facility (last facility to be constructed) is scheduled to be completed in March 1987. However, a previous Auditor General performance audit report forecasts completion in October 1987. If this delay occurs, DOC would be short an additional 100 maximum beds. (See Auditor General report #85-2, Department of Corrections, Facilities Construction Division, page 34.)

TABLE 5

PERMANENT BEDS REQUIRED FOR ADULT MALE INMATES
AFTER CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM COMPLETION
IN MARCH 1987

<u>Custody Level</u>	<u>Current Permanent Housing Available</u> (1)	<u>Construction Program Additions</u> (2)	<u>Total Permanent Housing After Construction</u> (3)	<u>Estimated Inmate Population</u> (4)	<u>Surplus/ (Shortage) Permanent Housing</u>
Minimum/Community	2,310	1,020	3,330	4,564	(1,234)
Medium	2,765	2,752	5,517	1,469	4,048
Maximum	972	768	1,740	2,754	(1,014)
Administrative Segregation	<u>180</u>	<u> </u>	<u>180</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>75</u>
Total	<u>6,227</u>	<u>4,540</u>	<u>10,767</u>	<u>8,892</u>	<u>1,875</u>

- (1) Does not include 1,541 temporary beds currently in use. These beds and possibly some deteriorated permanent facilities are scheduled for replacement by new construction beds.
- (2) Includes 422 minimum and 708 medium custody permanent status emergency beds currently under construction.
- (3) Community Corrections and DWI beds are included because the Department's estimated inmate population also includes these.
- (4) The numbers in this column were obtained by multiplying total estimated adult male inmate population in March 1987 by the percentage of inmates assigned to each custody level at reclassification using the FPS Custody Determination Instrument. See Correctional Services Group, Inc. (CSG) report, p. 33, for FPS security distribution percentages at reclassification.

Source: Prepared by Auditor General staff from CSG report, p. 33, Auditor General Department of Corrections Facilities and Construction Division performance audit, February 1985, p. 2, and DOC male inmate population estimates, DOC bed capacity report, and other department information

Department Will Also Lack Minimum Beds After Construction - In addition to lacking high security beds, the Department will also be short on minimum custody beds. As illustrated in Table 5, when current construction is complete DOC will lack minimum beds but will have an overabundance of medium custody beds.

Advance Planning Required
To Alleviate Shortage

DOC needs to begin addressing its maximum custody bed needs. The long lead time for prison construction requires that planning begin as soon as possible to construct the needed facilities. DOC can immediately make available more maximum beds by continuing to move appropriate protective segregation inmates from the ASPC-Florence Central Unit. Several other alternatives exist that could provide needed maximum beds including altering existing facilities, redirecting the current construction program and developing further construction plans.

Immediate Action Needed - Because of the typically lengthy time frames for prison construction, the Department should begin planning to provide maximum custody beds. In a previous audit report of the current prison construction program our analysis indicated that a minimum of 24 months is required to construct a major prison facility.* This construction time frame, when combined with the time required to develop a funding request and receive funding, would push any new construction completion past the current construction program completion date of October 1986.

The objective classification instrument now under development by the Department would be the best indicator of future bed needs. However, the new classification system will not provide accurate information until validated in late 1986. Implementation and validation of the system in late 1986 will occur too late for use in planning for the facilities construction currently in process.

* Report #85-2, Department of Corrections, Facilities and Construction Division, page 34.

The consultant's analysis indicating a need for more maximum security beds is sufficient to begin planning for additional construction or other alternatives. While the FPS classification model used in the consultant's analysis may not apply directly to Arizona, the model is a validated objective classification instrument. The magnitude of the projected maximum bed shortage strongly indicates a need for the planning for new maximum beds prior to implementation of the new classification system.

Additional Maximum Beds Could Be Made Available Immediately - DOC can immediately make available additional maximum beds by continuing to move appropriate protective custody inmates from the ASPC-Florence Central Unit. Currently, the Department continues to unnecessarily house some protective segregation inmates in the maximum custody facility. DOC could better control the protective segregation population by implementing a two-tiered housing system.*

The Department continues to house some lower custody protective segregation inmates in its maximum custody facility. Until recently, DOC housed all protective segregation inmates in its maximum custody facility. Auditor General analysis shows that at least 43 percent of the July 1985 protective segregation population entered that status from a medium or lower custody unit. According to both the classification and security consultant teams, many of these inmates could be placed in lower custody protective segregation. Professional correctional literature says that some states have protective segregation units in medium custody facilities.**

DOC has addressed this problem by recently converting a general population housing pod at the Perryville prison for medium custody protective segregation use. In September 1985 DOC relocated 93 protective segregation inmates from the Central Unit to Perryville, leaving more than 200 still at the Central Unit. Protective segregation inmates now

* Protective segregation is a form of separation from the general population for inmates requesting or requiring protection from other inmates.

** Protective Custody In Adult Correctional Facilities, American Correctional Association, 1983, pp. 14-15.

occupy about one-fourth of available maximum custody beds. Our analysis indicates that at least another 41 inmates in maximum custody protective segregation might be eligible for placement in a lower custody segregation unit. However, DOC has no further plans for other protective segregation reallocations. According to the Department, these inmates cannot be moved until an entire housing unit is open so these inmates can be kept segregated. Currently, the Department does not have enough beds to do this.

The Department should consider using a two-tiered protective segregation program to discourage inmates from requesting this status except for documentable reasons. The classification consultant states that a two-tier system should help ensure that inmates requesting protective segregation legitimately need the extra protection and supervision.* Inmates in the first level are admitted into protective segregation either by staff or have themselves produced a legitimate, documentable reason for needing protective segregation. These inmates would have the same rights and privileges as general population inmates. Second level inmates are those not willing or able to document the request for protective segregation. Inmates in this level would have mandatory rights but certain privileges would be kept to a minimum. Such an environment should encourage the inmate to either transfer back to general population or substantiate his protective segregation need. Correctional standards say that care should be taken to ensure that inmates do not see protective segregation placement as desirable.

Alternatives Exist To Provide Needed Maximum Beds - Several alternatives exist for the Department to alleviate its current and future maximum custody bed shortage.

First, the Department could analyze whether any existing medium security facilities could be upgraded to securely house maximum custody inmates. Second, the Department could request that the Legislature modify the

* According to our classification consultant, most states require some substantiation of the potential threat to the inmate to warrant protective segregation. Arizona provides protective segregation upon inmates' requests.

current construction program, building more maximum custody beds and fewer medium beds. Finally, the Department could request new construction. As mentioned previously, an additional 1,000 maximum beds at an estimated cost of \$45 million are required by March 1987. However, modifying the existing program would reduce costs by not building unneeded medium custody beds.

CONCLUSION

The Department does not have enough maximum custody beds to meet current and future adult male inmate population needs. DOC currently lacks enough maximum custody beds. Further, the construction program will not provide enough maximum beds for either current or future use. DOC needs to immediately begin evaluating alternatives for providing additional maximum custody bed space.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Department should continue to transfer appropriate protective segregation inmates to specific areas within lower custody facilities.
2. The Department should consider several alternatives to provide additional maximum custody bed space, including:
 - a. analyzing existing facilities to determine whether upgrading to higher custody level is possible,
 - b. modifying the current construction program, and
 - c. requesting new construction.
3. The Department should use its new objective classification system, once it is implemented and validated, to refine its bed space requirement projections.
4. The Department should develop formal policies and procedures for identifying and classifying protective segregation inmates. Also, DOC should consider adopting a two-level protective segregation system.

OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION

During the audit we developed pertinent information on early release programs, isolation cells, and the adult male reception center.

EARLY RELEASE TO ALLEVIATE OVERCROWDING

Although early release programs can be an effective emergency management tool for reducing prison overcrowding, Arizona has limited the use of this option in recent years. An analysis of Arizona's inmate population indicates that more than one-fourth could be released early with little likelihood of rearrest. However, DOC must first develop and validate an objective classification system to ensure proper evaluation and identification of early release candidates.

Arizona's use of early release has changed over time. The original early release program, effective for crimes committed after August 1974, consisted of 180-day mandatory release for those inmates completing their maximum sentences. Statutory changes effective for crimes committed after May 1985 made the 180-day release discretionary, requiring inmates to meet criteria established by DOC through rules and regulations.

Several other states, including Michigan, Maryland and Kentucky, have utilized some form of early release programs in order to stabilize their growing prison populations. Early release programs generally include some form of evaluation system whereby inmates are assessed to determine their potential for committing new crimes after being released early. Once evaluated, low risk inmates can be released from 30 to 180 days prior to their parole eligibility or completion of sentence date.

Results of a study conducted for the Auditor General by Correctional Services Group, Inc., suggest that there are a number of Arizona inmates who could be released from confinement 60 to 180 days prior to their legal release date either through parole or expiration of sentence.

Using the Selective Incapacitation Model* developed by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the study results as shown in Table 6 indicate that almost 10 percent of the Arizona inmate population could be released early with extremely minimal threat to the safety and welfare of the general public, and that almost one-fourth could leave the prison early with only a minimal likelihood of further criminal activity.

TABLE 6
RESULTS OF EARLY RELEASE STUDY

<u>Category of Risk</u>	<u>Range (Points)</u>	<u>Percentage Of Inmates In Category</u>	<u>Likely Arrest Rates Within One Year Of Release</u>
LowLow	0 - 5	9.14	3 to 5%
Low	6 - 10	25.70	20 to 25%
Moderate	11 - 14	29.20	45 to 50%
High	11 - 20	29.50	65 to 70%
HighHigh	21 plus	6.50	85 to 90%

Population sample size = 339

Source: "Analysis of The Arizona DOC Offender Classification System," August 1985, Correctional Services Group, Inc.

* In the Selective Incapacitation Model assessment, points are assigned to an inmate based on the following factors.

- Offense Seriousness
- Prior Arrests
- Prior Juvenile Commitment
- Prior Imprisonment (Jail/Prison)
- History of Disciplinary Grade Demotion
- Age At Release
- Prior Parole Violations
- Weapon Used In Offense
- History Of Heroin/Barbituate Abuse
- Security Level At Release

Inmates receiving more points have a greater likelihood for recidivism and are therefore, less eligible for early release.

The implementation of an early release program could produce a savings for the State by reducing the inmate population in existing facilities. This reduction would make needed beds available and potentially improve the inmate classification process (see Finding III, page 37). These benefits can be achieved at minimal risk to public safety. According to the consultants, an inmate's likelihood of rearrest is no different after early release than at the completion of the full sentence.

Although an early release program could provide benefits to the State, DOC's existing classification system does not provide sufficient information to adequately evaluate inmates for early release. The subjective nature of the present system (see Finding III, page 37) cannot assure that only low risk inmates will be identified and selected for early release. However, DOC is developing an objective classification system, which when validated, could provide adequate information for a successful early release program.

ISOLATION CELLS

DOC lacks an adequate number of isolation cells to ensure effective inmate discipline. Many institutions have few or no cells for isolation. As a result, inmates sentenced to disciplinary isolation often must wait to serve their time or never serve their time.

DOC does not have an adequate number of isolation cells.* Currently, the department has 134 isolation cells. These cells account for less than 2 percent of permanent bed capacity and only 1.5 percent of total operating capacity. Because isolation cells are important to effective discipline, the Auditor General classification consultant suggests a minimum of 5 percent isolation cell capacity at every institution, or about 420 cells systemwide. The Federal Prison System currently builds its new prisons with 10 percent capacity reserved for isolation.

* Isolation cells house inmates for a short time. Inmates are placed in isolation cells for disciplinary detention and other purposes. Prisoners in isolation are not afforded activities or items generally considered to be privileges.

In addition, existing isolation cells are not well dispersed throughout the system. Eight of the existing institutions have no isolation cells. In addition, some facilities with isolation cells may not have enough. This causes some of their resident inmates to be transferred to other facilities for isolation. On July 18, 1985, for example, 21 of the 70 inmates in the Tucson-Rincon Isolation Unit were either Fort Grant or the Community Correctional Center-Tucson residents. Table 7 shows isolation cell distribution within the prison system.

TABLE 7
FACILITY BED CAPACITY AND ISOLATION CAPACITY

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Operating Capacity</u> ⁽¹⁾	<u>Isolation Cells</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Florence	2,983	43	1.4
Tucson	1,453	50	3.4
Perryville	1,400	12	.9
Fort Grant	803	25	3.1
Community Correction Center-Tucson	140	4	2.9
Other Institutions	<u>1,673</u>	<u>0</u>	
Total	<u>8,452</u>	<u>134</u>	1.6

(1) Includes permanent, temporary and permanent restricted beds.

Source: Prepared by Auditor General staff from DOC bed capacity information.

Lack of isolation cells also limits effective use of maximum custody bed space. DOC routinely houses otherwise manageable inmates at ASPC-Florence cellblock 6. These inmates are awaiting trial for disciplinary infractions and occupy beds that could be used for higher custody inmates. Auditor General security consultants recommend that when possible, inmates awaiting investigation or disciplinary actions for offenses other than escape or serious assault should be held in regional isolation cells while their cases are pending. Due to a lack of available isolation facilities, this has not been possible.

Because isolation cells are scarce, some inmates must wait months to serve disciplinary detention time, or never serve the time. According to the classification consultant, inadequate lockup space severely impedes effective classification system operation by allowing inmates assigned to disciplinary isolation to remain in the general population. DOC staff have stated that inmates often must wait five to six months for an open isolation cell. For example, as of July 2, 1985, 59 Florence South Unit (medium custody) inmates were awaiting disciplinary isolation. Of these, some had been sentenced to isolation since February 5, 1985.*

Some inmates never serve their isolation time because when a cell finally opens, they have either been transferred to a different institution or released from prison. Many inmates from all ASPC-Florence units sentenced to disciplinary isolation are placed on a waiting list. In late 1984 and again in January 1985 Central Unit management deleted all inmates on the disciplinary isolation waiting list prior to these dates. This was necessary because the list was extremely backlogged and inmates recently placed on the list would probably not serve their time for many months, if ever.**

ALHAMBRA RECEPTION AND TREATMENT CENTER

Our analysis found that security is deficient at the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center. In addition, the facility is extremely overcrowded. Consultants recommend that the facility be replaced.

* The Department in 1980 converted 40 isolation cells in the South Unit into inmate operated business rooms. Recently, the Department issued a request for proposals to reconvert these into isolation cells.

** DOC's lack of single cells for medium custody inmates also contributes to the problem. Because DOC houses many general population inmates in dormitory settings, the Department is not able to lock some inmates requiring isolation in their cells in the event isolation facilities are not available. American Correctional Association standards require that long-term adult correctional institutions consist of 100 percent single cells for housing these custody levels. Though single cells are not always practical and affordable, they constitute the best housing configuration according to corrections professionals.

The Department uses the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center to test and initially classify adult male inmates who enter the prison system, and to process parole violators. After receiving their custody classifications inmates are then assigned to an appropriate prison facility. Alhambra is located in Phoenix on the grounds of the Arizona State Hospital.

Security and classification consultants retained by our Office found the reception center inadequate in terms of both security and housing. Perimeter and internal security deficiencies resulted in the security consultants rating the reception center a minimum custody facility, although it is used for maximum custody confinement (see Finding I, page 13). A reception center must be able to provide maximum custody confinement to separate predatory or assaultive inmates from other inmates.

In addition to deficient security, the Reception Center cannot properly house its inmate population. The design capacity of the facility is 170 beds. However, the average daily population in fiscal year 1984-85 was 364 inmates. Overcrowding is caused by a lack of beds within the prison system. Inmates cannot be transferred out until beds become available. Some maximum custody inmates have been held for three months before beds were available. In order to accommodate this overcrowding, from four to 12 inmates have been assigned to cells designed for two to four inmates. This multiple occupancy increases security risks and prevents isolation of problem inmates.

The classification consultant concluded that "The Alhambra physical plant is one of the most deficient facilities the consultant team has toured in developing or evaluating classification systems in 20 other states." The consultant further recommended that the Reception Center be replaced with a 300 to 350 single cell occupancy facility that would provide sufficient space for housing, offices, programs and support services.

AREAS FOR FURTHER WORK

During the course of the audit we identified several potential issues that we were unable to pursue because they were beyond the scope of our audit or we lacked sufficient time.

- Are existing juvenile facilities adequate to provide proper control, observation and confinement?

Finding I and the consultants' security report both focus on the security problems within the adult institutions. However, our preliminary analysis indicated that security deficiencies also exist at some juvenile facilities. These deficiencies stem from inadequate functional design and security perimeters, a lack of locking devices, internal barriers and communications systems, and inadequate staffing levels. Further audit work is needed to identify the types and causes of security deficiencies at the juvenile facilities.

- Are the Department's community corrections centers sufficient and are screening procedures adequate?

The purpose of placing inmates in community corrections centers is to prepare them for reentry into the community. However, the largest community corrections center is located in Tucson, while a majority of the inmate population is from the Phoenix area. The Department has no community corrections center for adult females. According to Department officials, DOC has attempted many times to place a community corrections center in Phoenix. However, the complicated neighborhood approval process has not allowed placement. The Department is in the process of again proposing a site. In addition, the screening of inmates for admittance into the community corrections centers may be inadequate, resulting in potential security breaches. Some nonrelease status inmate residents have escaped. Further audit work is needed to determine the adequacy of the community corrections centers and the screening process used to place inmates in them.

- Are other alternatives rather than the construction of new prisons available to alleviate overcrowding?

Other states have developed innovative alternative methods to address overcrowding in correctional systems. These include the use of private correctional vendors, early release programs and alternatives to incarceration. Further audit work is needed to determine whether these alternatives are appropriate for Arizona.

Arizona Department of Corrections

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BRUCE BABBITT
GOVERNOR

SAMUEL A. LEWIS
DIRECTOR

November 18, 1985



Douglas R. Norton, Auditor General
2700 North Central Avenue, Suite 700
Phoenix, AZ 85004

Dear Mr. Norton

Our comments on the revised preliminary report draft of the Performance Audit of the Department of Corrections, Adult Institutions Security are enclosed. As you will note, these comments address the audit findings in terms of the total mission of this Department as well as our philosophy regarding the comprehensive approach planned for their resolution.

If there are additional questions, please advise.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "S. Lewis".

Samuel A. Lewis
Director

SAL/jw
Enclosure

The mission statement of the Department of Corrections is to receive, care, control and maintain custodial responsibility for persons committed to the State's prisons and juvenile correctional institutions. This mission statement requires that the Department operate in a manner to ensure the:

- Protection of the Public
- Protection of the Staff
- Protection of the Inmate

In addition, the Department has accepted the implied responsibility of returning to society inmates who are better prepared to function in the "free world" and not return to criminal activity. For this to occur, institutional operations must include the major elements of prison management:

- Security
- Housing
- Classification
- Programming
- Staff Training.

While institutional security is of primary importance in the overall mission of the Department of Corrections, it must be understood that the management of any prison system requires attention to many priorities including allocations of resources for:

- Water Systems
- Sewer Systems
- Additional beds/housing
- Communications

- Support Services
- Fire Supression Systems
- Maintenance
- Program development, and other priorities

All of these activities/issues influence institutional security and are also legitimate elements of a comprehensive security program.

This administration has previously identified many of the major findings presented in the Auditor General's report on Security of Adult Institutions. The findings have been addressed during the past 14 months--through enforcement and revision of existing policy/procedure, through drafting of new policies/procedures and through vehicle, visitor and facility security surveys. Other measures have been added or implemented at the institution which also address the findings in the report.

Many of the deficiencies noted in the report have already been corrected and others will be eliminated by the allocation of funds from the current year budget and the budget request submitted for fiscal '86-87. The balance of the finding will be considered for inclusion in a comprehensive security program and in long range facility planning.

Security is not a fence, a CCTV system, a no-man's land or a tower--security also includes the development of programs that occupy prisoners' time and interest. Security includes trained staff and inmates' interaction in such a way as to diminish the possibility of escalation of problems that surface in any prison.

Security is a program...a comprehensive program that

includes policies and procedures, staff attitudes, appropriate construction/housing, detection systems, physical barriers and apprehension capabilities. Security is the responsibility of all staff including security staff, program staff, support service staff and administrative staff.

A comprehensive security program, for one reason or another, has not been completely implemented in Arizona. Such a program was not in place when the current administration assumed leadership. The conditions that have existed did not suddenly appear...they evolved over a period of years and during several administrations.

The current administration is in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive security program. An in house study has been completed regarding the current state of security at the various institutions. A consultant study has also been completed regarding the security levels of the various institutions. A consultant has been retained to propose a revised Classification System and Facility Custody rating system.

Past studies on security are being reviewed and compared with current assessments in order to achieve a more comprehensive view of "security" as it relates to total institutional management. This is a necessary step in that the experts in the field of corrections do not all agree on issues of fences, towers, detection devices, staffing, classification or other elements of institutional management. If there was one final authority, the divergence of security programs would not exist.

In the past, budget requests were not appropriated, problems

existed with site-selection, cost over-runs, and overpopulation caused management decisions to be made based on priorities that existed at the time. It is not the responsibility of this administration to judge whether those decisions were correct, nor is it the responsibility of the current administration to dwell on the events of the past. It is the responsibility of this administration to develop a comprehensive program of security that includes all of the elements earlier referenced. It is the responsibility of this administration to ensure that there is a systematic integration of these elements into institutional operations. This must be accomplished in a manner that results in the most effective transition and with the least disruption. Considering the volatile nature of any prison population, particularly when severe overpopulation exists, the latter issue is of prime concern.

The conditions that exist in the Arizona Department of Corrections are not unique to Arizona:

- Two percent of the U.S. population between the ages of 15 and 64 are under some type of criminal supervision. This figure has doubled in the last five years.
- Over half of all states in the country are more than 110% full in prison population.
- In Arizona, the incarceration rate in the last 10 years has increased 154%. In Arizona, during the same period, the crime rate has decreased 8.9%.
- Across the country the criminal codes have become the driving force behind inmate population increases.

- Many corrections departments in the nation are getting into trouble over the accurate estimation of new beds needed and projected inmate populations.
- Higher incarceration rates make prison populations difficult to predict.

In the critical area of inmate classification, it has been suggested that Arizona misclassifies inmates when compared with the Federal Prison System of Inmate Classification. This issue must be viewed with caution in light of the fact that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons has a homicide rate which is two and one-half times the rate of any state prison systems.

While the current administration of the Department of Corrections is aware of deficiencies that exist, the appropriate plan of action calls for the development of a comprehensive security program, not "band-aid" therapy. This program is being currently addressed by:

- A Comprehensive Staffing Analysis
- Development of a new Classification system
- Development of a revised custody rating for facilities.
- A Budget Request for current facility security and program needs.

The administration's goal is that this program design be completed by March of 1986 and systematic implementation thereafter. To do less than the total job is not acceptable to the current administration.



SECURITY AUDIT
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
N. R. COX ASSOCIATES, INC.

July 1985

August 1, 1985

William Thomson, Director
Performance Audit Division
111 West Monroe, Suite 600
Phoenix, AZ 85003

Dear Mr. Thomson:

Attached is the Security Audit Report, Arizona Department of Corrections, performed in accordance with Auditor General's Contract #0477. The report is prepared in five sections.

The consultants wish to acknowledge the proficiency of your staff in conducting a preliminary analysis, and their courteous assistance provided in support of our work. Their support and cooperation was instrumental in bringing our effort to a successful conclusion within the time and resource parameters established for the audit.

We also wish to acknowledge and applaud the open and cooperative attitude of Department of Corrections staff personnel at all levels. With a few rare exceptions, we found them to be genuinely dedicated to the improvement of their facilities and procedures. As a result, they shared information openly and willingly toward that end.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or require clarification regarding the contents of this report. We appreciate the opportunity to provide this service to the citizens and officials of the State of Arizona.

Sincerely,


John E. Duffley
Vice President

NRC:cr

Enclosure

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SECURITY AUDIT

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, the Arizona Department of Corrections has experienced a number of security problems and escapes which have been highly profiled in the media. The result has been the focusing of public attention on the ability of the Department of Corrections to fulfill its primary objective: to protect the public by holding safely and securely those entrusted to its care.

As a result of this concern, the Auditor General's Office selected qualified consultants to conduct a performance audit of the Department, to include an evaluation of the adequacy of security measures in key facilities throughout the State. The consultants were also requested to independently survey the adequacy of security features and practices within the Department.

Consequently, N. R. Cox Associates, Inc., of San Antonio, Texas, was selected to conduct a security audit and to perform the above described services. This audit was conducted during a six week period, beginning June 19, 1985, through August 1, 1985.

The following report contains the results of the survey and recommendations of the consultants. Section II describes optimal security criteria and security features. Section III contains the findings and recommendations of the consultant team. Section IV contains the conclusions of the consultants.

A. Audit Objectives

This project is undertaken to provide a survey of security systems in five selected facilities in the Arizona Department of Corrections, and is designed to address the following questions:

1. Are security perimeter systems adequate to provide proper containment of inmates?
2. Are existing facilities adequate to provide proper inmate control, observation, and confinement?
3. Are past escapes representative of ongoing procedural and facility deficiencies?
4. Are custody levels of the various facilities appropriate to the assigned inmate population?
5. Do institutional security communication systems adequately meet the stated goals and objectives?
6. Are security procedures and post orders adequate to minimize security breaches and maintain security?
7. Are sufficient staff available to meet security objectives?
8. Will proposed remedies and interim measures adequately counteract identified security deficiencies and maintain security needs of the institution?
9. What is the approximate cost of structural modifications, repairs, or purchase of equipment required to meet the security needs of the various institutions?

B. Limitations of the Audit

The Audit was conducted during a six week period beginning June 19, 1985, and concluded with the delivery of a final report on August 2, 1985. Within this time frame, the consultant team visited five

institutional complexes which collectively contained 16 separate facilities, as follows:

o Arizona State Prison - Florence Complex

Central Unit
Cell Block 6
South Unit
East Unit
North Unit
Special Programs Unit

o Arizona State Prison - Perryville complex

San Juan Unit
Santa Cruz Unit
San Pedro Unit
Santa Maria Unit

o Arizona State Prison - Tucson Complex

Rincon Unit
Tents Unit
Minimum Custody Unit
Santa Rita Unit

o ARTC - Alhambra

o Arizona State Prison - Fort Grant

Because of the broad scope of the performance audit and the need to retain consultants with specific technical expertise in other areas, resources available for the Security Audit were constrained and thereby limited the size of the consultant team. Three consultants were assigned to the Security Audit team, two of whom conducted the on-site surveys assisted by staff members of the Auditor General's Office.

The Department of Corrections made available large volumes of detailed documentation regarding policies, practices, physical design, staffing allocations, escape reports, statistical compilations, noted deficiencies, corrective measures, etc.

Although much of this information had been compiled and summarized during the Auditor General's Preliminary Survey, large volumes of detail remained in a form that was not conducive to survey analysis.

These constraints on time, resources, and information required the consultants to rely heavily on selected documentation and reports, on-site observations and interviews, and preliminary surveys prepared by the staff of the Auditor General's Office as the basis for their recommendations and conclusions. Consequently, this report should be construed as the consultant team's expert opinion as to the adequacy of security practices and measures based upon their collective experience and qualifications.

Throughout the report, numerous areas of deficiencies have been identified which require more thorough analysis in order to formulate solutions. In addition, cost estimates are often incomplete because of the inability to fully define the scope of a particular deficiency within the constraints of the project. Where possible, the consultants have included unit cost data which may be used to estimate the total cost of corrective action once additional information is collected or made available by the Department.

C. Project Approach and Methodology

The consultant team began its work by reviewing the preliminary survey and bulk files (departmental documents) assembled by the Auditor General's staff. In addition, the consultants visited selected divisions within the Department of Corrections and the Arizona Department of Administration, Risk Management Division to collect additional information and documents.

Based on the results of this review, the consultants prepared evaluation forms from spreadsheets and other data contained in the preliminary survey for use their during on-site inspections of the facilities. Selected policies and procedures were reviewed, and the corresponding practices were observed during the on-site visits. A member of the Auditor General's staff prepared a list of specific deficiencies gleaned from the Preliminary Survey, and returned to each of the facilities to verify the status of corrective action. The consultants then reviewed the results of this validation effort and cross-tabulated the information with their own observations and data collection efforts.

Prior to the on-site visits, the consultant team, in conjunction with members of the Auditor General's staff, identified key areas of security concern to evaluate during the visit. During the on-site visits, the consultants' observations of security features and practices were supplemented by interviews with key facility staff members. Following the on-site visits, additional documentation was reviewed to cross-validate observations and conclusions. In addition, a debriefing was held with the Director and key departmental staff during which consensual validation of the consultants' findings was conducted.

II. SECURITY CRITERIA

Adequate institutional security in a correctional setting is the result of collective security features and practices, and does not rely solely on any single measure for effectiveness. Key component features which combine to impact institutional security include: functional design, the physical enclosure (perimeter), direct security measures (staff observation and control), indirect security measures (communication, audio/video surveillance, locking devices, internal barriers, etc.), staffing levels, and reliable classification and assignment of inmates to appropriate custody levels.

The importance of any one of these security measures depends upon the adequacy or inadequacy of each of the other measures. For example, inmates locked in single occupancy cells during sleeping hours require periodic surveillance by staff members to ensure they are not attempting to harm themselves or to effect an escape. During daylight hours, however, when inmates are released from their cells to engage in various work, educational, or visitation activities, a higher level of staffing is necessary for supervision and control in order to compensate for the removal of a major security barrier (cell containment). Likewise, if security barriers such as locking devices, perimeter enclosures, etc. are in disrepair or malfunctioning, staffing or other security measures must be increased in order to maintain an acceptable level of security and safety.

A. Security Objectives

The degree of security deemed necessary to ensure custody and safety varies among institutions within a correctional system. Individual facilities should be designed and operated according to the level of custody required for the majority of the inmates housed therein. Although a full range of custody levels may be found at any given

time within an institution, the majority of each institution's population should carry the same custody classification as the facility.

1. General Guidelines

The uniqueness of correctional activities and operations requires that facilities designed to contain those activities be functionally efficient and responsive to security and programming needs.

- o The institutional complex should ensure that public safety is maximized through the secure custody of offenders within the confines of the institutional enclosure.
- o Within the complex, the physical plant should enable staff and inmates to function effectively in a safe and humane environment.
- o Component facilities should meet required codes and professional standards in the field, should be consistent with applicable constitutional and correctional case law, and enable the application of contemporary professional practice.
- o Physical relationships of buildings and areas should be functionally efficient so that staff resources may be conserved, inmate movements and activities may be adequately supervised and facilitated, and that daily activities may take place without undue disruption or complexity.
- o The facility must provide for access by the public to enhance authorized activities while maintaining the integrity of safety and security systems.

- o There should be adequate physical barriers to contain and segregate internal disturbances and allow conversion from an "open" style of management to a more secure posture for the duration of an emergency situation.
- o The facility should be capable of adaption to a higher level of security if required in the future at minimal cost.
- o Physical barriers should be avoided which reduce opportunities for direct observation by staff of inmate housing, activities, and movement.
- o The appearance of a complex should generate public acceptance and approval, and allay any fears or concerns about the adequacy of security of internal operations.

2. Custody Level Guidelines

Custody levels are generally classified as maximum (level 6), close (level 5), medium (level 4), low medium (level 3), minimum (level 2), and community custody (level 1).

- o Maximum Custody

Maximum custody facilities are characterized by strong perimeter security, usually a solid wall or double security gauge wire mesh. Fences should be augmented by detection devices and razor ribbon barriers to discourage attempts to scale the enclosure and gun towers located strategically on the perimeter. Housing should be of single cell construction with appropriate maximum security grade locks, doors, walls, and fixtures. Inmate movement within the enclosure is by staff escort, with highly

dangerous offenders moved individually by two officers. Standard procedure frequently includes the use of shackles and body restraints when prisoners are moved from one location to another or are moved to the yard for exercise. Contact with other inmates is minimal and always supervised.

o Close Custody

Close custody facilities are characterized by strong perimeter security and single cell housing configurations, in accordance with the same specifications as maximum custody facilities. Movement throughout the facility is usually by escort or direct observation and supervision, however, individual restraints are not usually standard procedure. Inmates may congregate in work areas, educational classrooms, and other activity areas under the direct and constant supervision of staff.

o Medium Custody

Medium custody facilities are likewise characterized by strong perimeter security built according to the same standards as maximum custody enclosures. Although single cells are preferred, medium custody facilities frequently use multiple occupancy cells and dormitories, especially for low medium (level 3) prisoners. Inmates are permitted reasonable freedom of movement within the confines of the institutional enclosure, however, movement should always be supervised by staff. Routine supervision is required for inmates who participate in program and work assignments within the security perimeter. Direct and

constant supervision is required for inmates who participate in program and work assignments outside the secure perimeter. Freedom of movement within the secure perimeter and corresponding supervision requirements may be limited for observation, disciplinary, or administrative (classification) purposes. Freedom of movement outside the secure perimeter may be increased and corresponding supervision requirements may be reduced for selected inmates.

o Minimum Custody

Minimum custody facilities may be enclosed by a single wire mesh fence, or may have no physical enclosure at all. Housing may be single rooms or dormitory style. Building materials and fixtures are usually of conventional design, without major security barriers. Control is exercised by staff supervision and origin and destination logs. Inmates are permitted considerable freedom of movement, frequently without being constantly observed by staff members. Classification plays a major role in the security of minimum custody facilities, since there is a heavy reliance on inmate self discipline for adherence to rules, regulations, and procedures. Even in the absence of perimeter fencing, perimeter lighting and perimeter patrols are required during hours of darkness to discourage unauthorized departures and the introduction of contraband from outside sources. Minimum custody inmates may be housed in medium or maximum custody facilities to

accomplish housekeeping chores, and may work unsupervised outside of a security perimeter.

o Community Custody

This designation is usually reserved for those inmates who work or participate in educational opportunities in local communities. These inmates usually return to a controlled facility at the end of the work day. The facility may be a minimum custody facility or a community residential center. Origin and destination logs are usually used for control purposes as well as periodic verification of attendance at authorized work or educational activities by custodial staff, employers, teachers, etc.

B. Primary Security and Control Measures

There are five primary measures guiding the provision of adequate security for correctional institutions. These measures are perimeter security, direct security measures, indirect security measures, policies and procedures, and classification.

1. Perimeter Security

As discussed in paragraph II.A above, perimeter security is important for all levels of institutional custody, to include minimum and community custody housing. The primary purpose of security barriers and control procedures are to discourage any escape, intrusion, or smuggling attempts. There are no perimeter barriers that cannot, with time and the proper equipment, be breached. Perimeter security features, therefore, should be designed to delay escape or intrusion

attempts for a sufficient length of time to allow observation or detection by other means.

Perimeter security for maximum, close, and medium custody facilities should consist of a double wire mesh fence. The inner fence should be a minimum of 14 feet high, the fence fabric should be at least 6 gauge galvanized with 2 inch security gauge mesh. Sections should be joined with a security grade girth strap. The inner fence should be set in a 3 foot deep continuous concrete curb with the bottom mesh imbedded in the curb. The fence should be topped with at least one 30 inch concertina razor ribbon coil with a second coil located at the 9 foot level. The outer fence should be 12 feet high and a minimum of 15 feet from the inner fence, and should be of the same construction. The space between the fences should be gravel covered, sloped to the outside for drainage, and include additional razor ribbon barriers. The inner fence should be equipped with an electronic perimeter detection system, consisting of several zones and monitored in the control center.

Penetrations of the security perimeter should be through pedestrian or vehicular sallyports monitored by a control center or tower. Outside of the fences, there should be a perimeter roadway which encircles the entire perimeter and from which the perimeter fences and compound may be viewed from a patrol vehicle without obstruction. There should also be a fence lighting system that illuminates the entire perimeter without limiting observation into the compound at night. The

patrol vehicle should maintain constant radio contact with the complex control center. There should be guard towers located at strategic points for custody level 4, 5, and 6 facilities. These should be manned 24 hours a day. Custody level 2 and 3 facilities may have guard towers but they may be manned less than 24 hours a day.

2. Direct Security Measures

Whenever possible, control and supervision should be provided through direct physical, verbal, and visual contact between staff and inmates. These direct security measures enable early detection and control of potentially dangerous or disruptive behavior; the ability to exercise judgement as to the severity of a threat to individual or institutional security; and produce a general calming effect due to the presence of staff.

Direct security should be used for:

- o unobtrusive monitoring of cells, dayrooms, and inmate activity/work areas;
- o monitoring of inmate movement through overlapping fields of vision between control points;
- o monitoring of inmate interaction with visitors, volunteers, and officials.

3. Indirect Security Measures

Indirect security relies upon features or barriers built into the environment to monitor and control inmate activity, access and movement. Effective use of indirect security measures enables reduced staffing requirements during periods of low inmate activity, extended fields of vision and hearing for

security personnel, consistent and predictable containment or delay, and a sense of safety and confidence during tense situations. Indirect security should be used for:

- o monitoring of perimeter barriers;
- o control of vehicular and pedestrian access to the secure compound;
- o increased privacy and security during sleeping hours for inmate housing; and,
- o isolating portions of the facility for containment of riots or disturbances.

4. Policies and Procedures

Perimeter, direct, and indirect security measures are effective only if staff are well informed as to the appropriate use of these measures. A key element in the initial and ongoing familiarization with the appropriate use of security measures are written policies, procedures, and post orders.

Policies should be formulated to include the general purpose or intent of the activity or parameters being defined, and serve as general guidelines for implementation of the stated purpose. Policies are usually formulated at the highest levels within the correctional organization and include requirements for promulgating procedures and documentation of compliance.

When procedures are required to be promulgated at complex or institutional levels, they should be returned to the central office for review and approval prior to implementation. The Department should select a set of objective professional

standards by which to validate the adequacy of the procedures being developed and implemented.

Post orders are used to describe the specific functions unique to a particular assigned position within an institution or complex. The orders should be in sufficient detail so that individuals assigned may review the requirements of that assigned post, and be fully familiar with the application of security measures required at that location. Post orders should be kept up to date and available at the post location for retrieval and reference.

5. Classification

Classification is the process whereby the characteristics of individual inmates are assessed in order to determine escape potential, propensity for violence, medical and program needs, the need for protective custody, and other special needs. Classification should be based upon an objective assessment model with evaluation criteria weighted to such a degree that the classification instrument assigns inmates to an appropriate custody or grade with less than 10% subjective override. The model should consider: the type of offense; the length of offense time served; recent adjustment to the institutional environment; past adjustment; prior escapes, including the type of prior escapes; assaults; narcotics use and smuggling; gang membership; mental illness or mental retardation; medical condition; and holds, warrants, or special status (such as deportation).

Classification plays a key role in institutional security. An inefficient or ineffective classification system can cause considerable difficulties for a department. If the classification procedure consistently underclassifies inmates, considerable danger is presented to staff and the general public. Assignments to lower custody institutions will be inappropriate, thereby resulting in escapes, assaults, and additional crimes. If inmates are consistently overclassified, the result is excessive costs to the taxpayer through the use of expensive security barriers and single cell configurations to house and control inmates to a degree higher than necessary. The disciplinary record of an inmate is a key indicator as to the level of custody required to maintain control.

Over-reliance on any single security measure may lead to a false sense of security and reduce the functional value of a facility. A balance must be maintained among the primary security measures so that one complements the other in order to meet security objectives. Coordination of all security measures relies heavily upon adequate communications and central control.

III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Detailed observations and evaluations of security measures have been collected in Section V, Consultant On-Site Observations. The following contains a summary of the findings and conclusions organized by the areas of inquiry listed in Section I.A, Audit Objectives.

A. Perimeter Security

Perimeter security was found to be adequate at the Central Unit and CB6, ASP Florence Complex. The Rincon Unit at the Tucson Complex is structurally sufficient but requires additional razor ribbon, as specified in Section II.B.1. Perimeter Security.

The remaining complexes and facilities have inadequate perimeter security fencing. These facilities lack continuous curbing on the inner fence and lack sufficient razor wire to discourage escape or intrusion attempts. Additional towers are frequently cited as necessary to enhance perimeter security, however, many of the towers currently in use are used to observe inmates in the yard rather than maintaining surveillance of the security perimeter. An adequately designed security perimeter with sufficient perimeter patrols can avoid the need for large numbers of towers to maintain the integrity of the perimeter. Likewise, adequately functioning detection devices along the perimeter can greatly enhance the effectiveness of this barrier, and continuous communication with patrol vehicles will enhance response time.

A number of the towers currently in use are largely ineffective because of temporary structures within the compound which interrupt lines of sight and create blind spots. For example, at the

ASP-Florence complex Central Unit, a double wide trailer is located next to Cell Block 4. Observation of this area is blocked from Tower 13.

Many of the perimeter enclosures surrounding the individual units lack or have inadequate sallyport corridors for vehicular access. Each of the Perryville units and Tucson, Santa Rita, have a single vehicular gate to access the unit. However, each has a pedestrian sallyport at the main entrance control station to access the inside of the perimeter.

The Special Programs Unit must use its vehicular sallyport gates to admit vehicles and pedestrians. Signs should be posted along the inner perimeter fence announcing that inmates are prohibited from approaching to within 25 feet of the barrier. Future perimeter fence lines should be constructed for easy line of site observation and include, at a minimum, a continuous curb at the base of the inner fence. A curved fence should be avoided.

Razor ribbon wire is infrequently used except along the top of the perimeter fencing. In some facilities, razor ribbon has been placed at various points along the perimeter where escapes have occurred. For example, at the Santa Rita unit in Tucson, an escape occurred when an inmate climbed over a fence in the corner of the greenhouse area. Additional razor ribbon has since been installed in that area to prevent a reoccurrence.

Razor ribbon wire may be used to compensate for the lack of a continuous curbing beneath the inner fence through the use of two 36 inch coils beginning at the fence line on the ground level and extending inward. In addition, another 36 inch coil should be

placed atop the coil adjacent to the inside of the outer perimeter fence. In addition, a 30 inch coil should be placed at the 9 foot level and at the top of the fence, where none currently exist.

With the exception of the Rincon Unit at Tucson and the Central Unit and CB6 at Florence, perimeter security is inadequate to prevent inmate escapes or intrusions, especially considering the freedom of access of inmates within these secure compounds and the lack of control of tools and cutting devices (see Section III.F.3).

Although these units have the best observed perimeters, they could be improved by installation of razor ribbon between the fences and on the inside of the outer perimeter fence to more effectively deter escapes.

B. Adequacy of Facilities

The consultants' overall evaluation of the physical facilities within the five complexes is that they are inadequate to meet the security needs of the inmate population assigned. This conclusion is based upon a number of factors.

1. Underclassification

During the observation of the various facilities, staff were consistently questioned about whether or not they felt the inmates assigned to their facilities were adequately classified. Staff consistently responded that 30 to 40% of the inmates assigned to their facilities were underclassified. In order to verify this observation by staff, the consultants reviewed disciplinary reports produced by the Department of Corrections. The report was requested to include inmates with

the largest number of disciplinary infractions listed in rank order. A review of the 100 inmates with the most disciplinary infractions revealed that 12 of the 100 (12%) were assigned to minimum custody facilities. A detailed printout of the records and movements of each of the 12 inmates was requested and received. With the exception of one, 11 of the 12 inmates had a consistent pattern of disruptive behavior including assaults, verbal and physical abuse, and narcotics possession and smuggling. These patterns were prevalent in the more recent, as well as the older, disciplinary infractions.

2. Inadequate Single Cells

The Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions promulgated by the American Correctional Association include a recommendation that long-term adult correctional institutions consist of 100% single cells for housing purposes. It is generally accepted among correctional professionals, although not always practical and affordable, that single cells constitute the best housing configuration. The consultants recommend that all housing in level 3 and above consist of single cells. In the absence of single cells, adequate staff should be assigned so that multiple occupancy and dormitory housing remain under constant supervision.

In addition to general housing requirements, single cells are necessary for segregation and control of inmates convicted of disciplinary infractions, violent or assaultive inmates, and mentally disturbed inmates who are "acting out." Each facility should have a sufficient number of single cells to meet their

segregation needs pending disciplinary hearings or transfer to higher level custody facilities.

3. Housing

Permanent facilities throughout the system make extensive use of dormitories for housing purposes. If dormitories must be used, for fiscal or philosophical reasons, there should be sufficient physical barriers to enable isolation of a particular dormitory in the event of a disturbance or riot. By physically containing a disturbance, the threat to staff and other inmates' safety is minimized, and the ability to restore order is enhanced since staff resources can be mobilized and concentrated on the point of the disturbance before it spreads to other parts of the institution.

In future construction of dormitories, it is recommended that safety vestibules (inner locking double doors at opposite ends of a pedestrian corridor) be constructed at the entrance to each dormitory.

4. Functional Design and Materials

The extensive use of tents, trailers, and other temporary structures of materials not designed to withstand extensive use or to serve as security barriers, should be avoided. The use of such housing divides inmates into small groups, obstructs vision, and requires a higher level of staffing to maintain adequate surveillance and control. For example, at the East Unit in the Florence Complex, 77 inmates are housed 11 each in a cluster of seven quonset huts, with an additional hut for

toilet/shower/laundry, and a hut for activity/office space. Although the consultants do not recommend dormitories for medium custody facilities, a single 77 bed dorm would be preferable to this cluster of huts.

Functional relationships within facilities and complexes are not reasonably related. The facilities within the complexes appear to have been randomly constructed and frequently lack adequate security features. For example, control centers are not strategically located within complexes; recreation yards, industries areas, visitation areas, medical areas, and educational areas, are not functionally related to inmate housing, resulting in considerable cross-traffic patterns within the facility and complex perimeters.

For example, at the Tucson and Perryville complexes, visitors must be bussed from visitor control to each unit. The transportation vehicles are operated by inmates. At Tucson visitors can wander into the MCU area or the warehouse and automotive maintenance areas. At Perryville they can walk into the ARCOR area.

5. Maintenance

Many of the facilities, although adequate initially, have become inadequate to meet security needs as a result of poor maintenance. In the Perryville Complex, for example, as inmate room keys and locks to individual cells become worn, several rooms may be accessed by one inmate room key, rendering the locking system ineffective.

In the Florence Complex there are numerous examples of deterioration of security features due to poor maintenance. Vent grills in cells in Cell Block 4 have been removed. The inmates may access the ductwork. Covers on the cell door locking mechanism for George Run is missing, exposing the mechanical mechanism. Lighting levels are poor. The light covers are not removed to clean the lenses, and lamps are not promptly replaced in the housing units or in the yard and perimeter lighting system. Some light lenses in isolation areas have been painted.

Water from showers in Cell Block 1 leaks into the cell door operating mechanisms. The cell doors must be opened manually. The electronic releases in the control station do not work. In Cell Blocks 5 and 7, the package and key pass boxes for the control centers to the corridors do not work. The mechanisms have been removed and the wiring has been exposed. The wall mounted lights on the perimeter wall are not hard wire connected to junction boxes, but are merely connected by standard plug and receptacle, which is very dangerous in a rain storm. Covers to junction boxes are missing, exposing wires and cables to the elements. Some conduit runs, located on the wall walkway and making footing hazardous for staff, have been abandoned because of improvements to the system; however, they have not been removed.

6. Control Centers

Consistently throughout the five institutional complexes and subordinate facilities, control centers were found to be

inadequately constructed and improperly protected. Rincon yard and housing unit control centers use 1/4 inch plexiglass in the windows. Applying pressure to the center of the plexiglass will cause it to "pop" out of the frame, allowing easy access by inmates. In other control rooms, 1/2 inch security glazing is used for protection. The glazing could not withstand a high velocity bullet from a pistol or rifle, or a battering from many of the available tools such as picks, heavy gauge iron, or fire extinguishers. Control rooms contain keys, vehicle keys, facility radios, gas, bolt cutters, and fire arms. Control rooms are the hub for all facility activities. Occupancy of these control centers by groups of inmates would render the facility totally vulnerable.

The consultants recommend that each of the control rooms be physically reinforced and secured. It is necessary for a control room to contain emergency response equipment such as large bolt cutters, a fire ax, and fire extinguishers; and it is important to include other emergency equipment such as a ladder, stretcher, and air packs. The solution is not to remove these items from the control center, but to secure the control center so that these items may be pressed into service as needed, yet remain secure from inmate possession.

Many of these facility deficiencies may be corrected with minimal expenditures, and without extensive new construction. However, it is important to avoid repeating similar mistakes in future construction and expansion. If at all possible, permanent facilities should be developed to replace tents, quonset huts, and

other temporary housing areas. When new construction is initiated at or near an existing site or complex, security features should be re-evaluated for the entire complex and adjusted accordingly based upon the newly planned facilities and their functional relationship to the existing complex.

C. Escapes

The following chart illustrates the number of escapes experienced by the Arizona Department of Corrections from 1981 to 1984.

Escapes Arizona DOC 1981 to 1984

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Escapes</u>	<u>Approx. Average Daily Population</u>	<u>Escapes Per 1000</u>
1981	109	4800	22.7
1982	61	5315	11.4
1983	73	6367	11.4
1984	80	7464	10.7

As may be seen, the number of escapes have fluctuated between a low of 61 in 1982 to a high of 109 in 1981. The rate per 1000 population, however, has declined considerably, with the 1984 rate of 10.7 approximately one-half of the escape rate in 1981 when there were fewer inmates and less crowding in the system.

In reviewing selected reports on inmate escapes, the consultants conclude that the deficiencies which characterize the majority of escape attempts are due to inadequate physical and procedural security measures. The declining rate of escapes per 1000 population is largely due to the strong emphasis placed by the administration on escape prevention measures, especially perimeter patrols. This illustrates the effectiveness of using procedures to compensate for physical or staffing inadequacies. Although glaring

inadequacies still exist, the impact is less severe because of intensive efforts by existing staff.

The consultants urge caution, however. The heavy emphasis on escape prevention procedures may cause staff to neglect other duties in order to monitor or prevent "perceived" escape attempts. It is possible for the staff to overcompensate and neglect other responsibilities, such as contraband control. The latter is of concern because an increased flow of contraband results in wider drug use throughout the inmate population, which combined with access to machines to fabricate weapons and tools to use as weapons, can produce a severe security hazard for the institution or complex.

The single most important factor in the prevention of escapes is a secure perimeter enclosure supplemented by adequate supervision and count procedures.

D. Custody Level

In attempting to evaluate the custody level of the various facilities inspected, the consultants reviewed departmental documentation to determine the current rated level for each facility to be inspected. The custody levels of facilities are not clearly delineated in any single document. A review of inmate custody levels assigned to various institutions (a common method of validating institutional custody level classifications) reveals numerous inconsistencies. For example, there appears to be a chronic problem of inmates, who require high security housing, being retained at the Alhambra Reception Unit pending space and transfer to other secure facilities. This is an example of

underclassification. In the Central Unit of the Florence Complex, a large majority of the bed space is occupied with protective custody inmates who may present security or behavioral problems. In addition, CB6 currently houses problem inmates who are not considered emotionally disturbed, but who are retarded with behavioral problems. In addition, inmates who are charged with major disciplinary violations in lower custody level facilities, are transferred to CB6 pending disciplinary hearings and dispositions. Segregation cells at the respective units or segregation cells in Central Unit should be used to house these inmates pending disciplinary decisions, many of which will not result in transfer to custody level 6 (maximum custody). **These inconsistencies represent misuse of close and maximum security bed space and create a departmental bottleneck.**

The protective custody prisoners in Central Unit represent a specific problem which needs to be corrected. The consultants recommend that the Department create two levels of protective custody classification and designate two housing areas to handle each respectively. One group should consist of high risk PC's and should be housed at the Central Unit in Florence, but these individuals should be screened out to a manageable number. Further, the second level of low risk PC's (individuals who do not present a threat to themselves or others, although may be placed in danger if mixed with the general population) should be housed in a 200 or 300 bed unit which is converted for protective custody use. The minimum security unit at Perryville, San Pedro, could be easily converted to such a purpose. Currently, expensive high security cells are being

occupied by inmates who can function effectively in minimum custody, less expensive housing.

Another inconsistency between inmate custody level and facility custody level is apparent when one reviews the gang situation in Department of Corrections facilities. Currently there are at least three prison gangs operating throughout the system: the Mexican Mafia, the Texas Syndicate, and Aryan Brothers. The latter gang has a code of "blood in - blood out." This means that a member must kill in order to be a member of the brotherhood, kill as ordered while a member, or be killed in order to get out. It does not matter how well gang members adjust to inmate programming or how near they may be to release. Once they join the gang and take the blood oath, they must do as ordered. These inmates are now spread throughout the Department's facilities and have ample opportunities for recruitment and growth.

The Florence Complex Investigative Unit appears to have a good knowledge of the actual gang membership. However, this information is not routinely shared with classification, nor are lists of gangs kept for reference because of public information requirements and possible court orders to reveal the list of memberships.

Gangs which have a "blood oath" are best controlled in a level 5 facility housed together. It is estimated that there are approximately 200 of these individuals, many of whom are already housed at the Central Unit or CB6. The consultants recommend that a concerted effort be made to identify additional gang members and to house them at the Central Unit or CB6 in order to minimize their

growth, influence, and activities throughout the Department. **The growing numbers of inmates seeking protective custody may be directly related to the threat of gang attack throughout the system.**

As mentioned above, custody level designations for facilities within the five complexes are unclear at best. A recent study, funded by NIC and conducted by James Henderson and Roy Gerard, developed custody level ratings for each facility based on ratings by staff throughout the system. The consultants reviewed these ratings prior to their on-site visits and re-evaluated the ratings upon their return. The ratings designated by the Henderson study and the ratings recommended by this consultant team are shown below.

Custody Level Ratings

Institutions	Henderson Study	Consultant Team
Cell Block 6	6	6
Central Unit	5	5
o South Unit	4	3
o East Unit	3	2
SPU	3	3
North O.T.	1	1
o Rincon	5	3
o Santa Rita	4	3
o Tent Unit	4	2
MCU	2	2
o Santa Cruz	4	3
o San Juan	4	3
Santa Maria	2	2
San Pedro	3	3
Fort Grant	1	1
Alhambra	2	2

The consultant team has rated South Unit as a level 3 facility because it is all dormitory housing with no single cells. East Unit and Tent Unit are rated as minimum custody facilities because the dormitory housing units cannot be secured. There is no way to isolate disruptive inmates within buildings until order can be restored.

The Rincon Unit was rated as a level 3 facility. It may be upgraded to a level 5 by increasing physical security in control centers, housing, and yard control stations, and by improving perimeter physical security by installing razor ribbon on the inside of the outer perimeter fence, around vehicular and pedestrian sallyports, and installing perimeter towers at the corners and five intersections and vehicular sallyports.

The Santa Rita, Santa Cruz, and San Juan facilities were rated as level 3 facilities because of the inadequate physical inner and outer perimeters. They may be upgraded through the addition of razor ribbon on the inside of the outer perimeter fence, on the unit perimeter fence, and on the perimeter building facade; upgrading the control centers; installing a vehicular sallyport; and, the addition of a bar at each window.

E. Communication Systems

Prior to the consultants' on-site visits, a report on the adequacy of Department communications, prepared by Rick Tannehill of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, was reviewed by the consultants. This report reflected a communications analysis and a projected number of frequencies based upon existing equipment. There was no attempt to evaluate the adequacy of communication coverage or the adequacy of numbers of communication devices available for operational purposes.

The consultants found uniformly throughout the system that communication systems were inadequate. First, the number of frequencies available to each complex were insufficient. Each facility within a complex should have its own frequency in order to avoid cross-traffic and blocking of communications. Complex

security staff should also have a separate frequency in order to guarantee open channel communications in the event of a security perimeter breach or alarm.

The consultants agree that each dormitory or housing unit should have at least one radio for routine and emergency communications. Likewise, each tower post, each supervisor, and each yard officer should be equipped with a hand held radio. Based upon these general guidelines, each facility throughout the Department should be surveyed to determine the exact number of additional radios required to meet basic communication and security needs.

The security problems generated by having too few frequencies within a facility are illustrated by the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt from the Santa Rita complex. In this incident, the inmates had a unit portable radio which was stolen while unattended. The radio transmit switch was jammed in the transmit mode to produce a continuous transmit tone. This effectively blocked reception of transmissions by other units to respond to the reported escape condition long enough for the inmates to make their escape.

It is especially important that officers assigned to dormitories and other inmate housing areas where direct contact is involved, have constant communication with central control. Should a disturbance erupt or an attack begin, an immediate alarm is necessary for rapid response and avoidance of an escalated conflict. All communications throughout a complex should be monitored by central control. Complex control should also monitor these frequencies.

F. Policy and Procedures

Current policies and procedures for the Department are being systematically reviewed, evaluated, and in some cases, rewritten. The consultants had the opportunity to review past policies and procedures and drafts of current revisions to policies and procedures.

Policies and procedures were generally well written and in a standard format. Departmental policies were clearly and concisely stated and the explanatory section included step-by-step procedural detail. Institutional staff were frequently required by the departmental policy to develop local procedures. In many instances, the local procedures simply restated the information contained in the departmental policy. This is due largely to the fact that the departmental policy contained too much detail.

It is recommended that a special unit or team be designated for the ongoing review, development, and evaluation of implementation procedures. This Departmental unit should draft policies for review and approval by the Director, transmit those policies to the field for implementation, and review the procedures returned by institutional staff for completeness and consistency.

A number of procedures were found to be inadequate during the consultants' on-site visits.

1. Counts

The Department of Corrections does not require standing counts. A standing count requires the inmate to physically stand next to a bunk or work station to be visually inspected by the

officer, and questioned if necessary, to ensure that all inmates are in good physical condition. By requiring inmates to stand, the possibility of a dummy or padding under a blanket being interpreted as a sleeping inmate, is avoided. **The Department of Corrections should require mandatory standing counts at least once per shift.**

Currently, Department policy requires three counts per day. **The consultants recommend that a minimum of five counts in each 24 hour period be conducted.** The institutions currently have, for the most part, three counts daily at approximately 5:00 a.m., 4:00 p.m., and 9:00 p.m. There is too long a span of time during which inmates may be unaccounted for during the day. In addition to the mandatory counts, there should also be informal counts. Maximum and minimum custody inmates should be accounted for once every three hours.

Inmate counts are a major method of accounting for inmates and preventing or deterring escape attempts. Inmates who are not in their proper places for counts should be strongly disciplined according to Departmental policy. There must be no movement of inmates during counts and inmates should not be out-counted in large numbers anywhere.

The current practice, at many institutions, of ongoing or running counts which involves each inmate checking in at a checkpoint and showing his ID card to the checker officer who checks him off on a master list, should be used as an extra count and not included in the mandatory counts.

2. Access Control and Visitation

Access control and visitation procedures and regulations are clearly articulated in written policy, however, are not being consistently followed in implementation. During the consultants' on-site visits, numerous examples of deficiencies in access control were found:

- o At the Tucson complex security there is no operated pedestrian sallyport, only two open fence gates.
- o At the Perryville and Tucson complexes, once visitors are inside the perimeter, they may wander all over the inside of the complex.
- o Visitors are transported in vans or buses operated by inmates who may handle, hide, and deliver contraband.
- o At the Tucson complex, visitors inside the complex perimeter may wander unescorted into the warehouses and automotive areas, and also through the buildings at the Minimum Custody Unit, including the housing units.
- o Visitors may wander into the ARCOR area without any restrictions.
- o A 7-Up delivery truck driver and his truck were observed having been admitted into the Santa Rita perimeter, in order to deliver soda.

Visitation rules were grossly ignored. Visitors were openly engaging in physical sexual contact without any attempt by officers to correct the practice. Santa Rita staff reported to the consultants that on the day prior to our visit, a sexual encounter between a female visitor and an inmate occurred in

the visiting strip search room. There was no staff available to supervise the visitors in the visiting room. On the day of our visit, the same condition existed in the visiting room. Three visits were going on, the strip search room was open, and no staff person was in the visiting room supervising the visits.

On Saturday, July 13, 1985, the consultants observed the open yard visiting area at the South Unit from the Central Unit wall. There was obviously sexual contact in the visiting yard between inmates and visitors. There was no staff observed attempting to require adherence to the visiting policy and procedures. Some inmates in the adjacent Central Unit yard had climbed on the walls of the handball court to see the spectacle in the South Unit yard. They apparently knew what was going to occur from past open yard programs.

3. Security of Tools, Equipment, Toxic and Flammable Materials

The consultants found numerous examples of tools, equipment, toxic and flammable materials unattended and unsecured throughout the five facilities.

- o Bench grinders at all facilities lack locks and security covers to prevent unauthorized use.
- o Portable welding and cutting torches with tips were not secured in many locations, including ARCOR, Central Unit maintenance, East Unit plumbing school, and other locations throughout the facilities the consultants visited.

- o Hacksaws, blades, and wire cutters were not controlled in or secured in most facilities including Central Unit maintenance shop, Central Unit and Perryville, ARCOR, Santa Rita, San Juan and Santa Cruz.
- o Propane, gasoline, acetylene and other toxic, combustible and explosive materials were not locked in adequate or secure areas. They were observed at most sites including Fort Grant, East Unit, Central Unit maintenance, Perryville ARCOR, and other facilities. They were unsecured within the facility or unit perimeter and were poorly secured in easily accessible areas.
- o Ladders were unsecured in the Central ARCOR yard near Tower 4 and an extension ladder lay unsecured in the Central Unit vehicular sallyport.
- o A 12 foot step ladder was unsecured in the Perryville ARCOR building.
- o An extension ladder lay unsecured, stored in the print shop at Santa Rita.
- o A 6 foot step ladder was unsecured in the Central Unit maintenance shop.
- o A 12 foot ladder was hung on wall brackets in the Central Unit kitchen with a light chain attached to the standard duty wall bracket.
- o Rebar, pipe, and other weapons stock was laying on the ground in the Perryville ARCOR area.
- o Rebar is used for fence posts at Central Unit grass plantings.
- o Pipe was unsecured in the Santa Rita maintenance shop.

Shadow boards should be utilized for all tools. They should be issued only to authorized personnel. A sign-out sheet should be used to account for them. Hacksaw blades should be restricted and strictly accounted for.

Inmate hobby and inmate operated business tools should be screened for acceptance. All tools should be inventoried and placed on a shadow board for each inmate. These tools should be secured and controlled by staff and issued utilizing a sign-out sheet in form process. The tools and equipment should be inventoried regularly. All institution tools should be inventoried monthly, especially at high custody facilities.

4. Post Orders

Although post orders had been prepared for most facilities, they were not found to be readily available at the post locations. This indicates that the post orders are most likely not being followed.

- o At Alhambra, the CSO on duty in E section did not know what post orders were. The unit control center officer could not find them. He produced an inmate census sheet.
- o The officer assigned to Tower 13, when asked for the post orders, pointed to some memos in a glass-enclosed bulletin board. The post orders, dated 1980, were in a file folder in the left-hand corner of the bulletin board.
- o The East Unit does not have post orders for yard or tower officers.

5. Security Checks

A security check must be defined in the Central Unit. For example, a unit log form lists that the officers have conducted security checks. However, these are actually inmate counts. Security checks include a systematic physical check of bars by striking them with a mallet to detect cut bars, checking locks to determine that they are working properly and have not been tampered with, checking locking devices to see that they are operational and have not been tampered with and/or are in need of maintenance. Security checks should be performed to determine that gates, doors, and trap doors are secured and have not been tampered with, and that windows have not been broken or, if broken, they have been replaced. A check list sheet can be formulated for this process. Security checks should be conducted once on each shift in each unit of each facility.

Security searches of inmate housing and other activity areas should be conducted regularly. Presently, the Santa Rita Unit has a designated search team that conducts all searches. It is important that a search team be well trained at their work as a unit. Other facilities should develop and utilize search teams to conduct regular searches and security checks.

6. Personal Property

The consultants found a number of examples of excess personal property throughout the five facilities. Inmates are apparently collecting large volumes of personal items, clothing, printed material, etc. These items create a fire

hazard and make cell searches for contraband extremely difficult.

During a tour of the Perryville complex facility, 13 inmates were being relocated to CB6 at the Florence complex from the Santa Cruz Unit, and were transporting their personal property with them. The 13 inmates were transported by a single van, and 100 boxes of personal items were transferred in two additional vans.

The consultants recommend that moderate size foot lockers with padlocks (master keys retained by correctional staff) be purchased and issued to inmates throughout the system. Inmates should then be required to store all personal property in the footlocker. Any excess items should be inventoried, placed in cardboard boxes, and stored for the inmate in another location away from the housing areas, or shipped to family or friends, or destroyed.

7. Weapons and Use of Force

It is the policy of the Department of Corrections that each institutional complex develop its own guidelines for qualification with weapons in accordance with the parameters established by the State Police Officer Combat course. The policy does not specify how often officers must qualify, or what type of weapons must be used for qualification. It is recommended that a departmental-wide standard policy be developed.

The Department also lacks a policy on the use of deadly force. This "shoot-no shoot" policy is extremely important in order to

demonstrate the officers are adequately instructed and well trained in the use of weapons which could result in serious injury or death. If an officer shoots and kills an inmate, as the result of a minor incident, and no departmental guidelines exist, the Department could be held liable under class action litigation for failure to train and failure to supervise. It is, therefore, important that the Department establish a policy on the use of deadly force, and guidelines regarding when the use of deadly force is appropriate, and when it is not. The May 1984 shooting incident in the Central Unit in which an inmate was wounded by a ricocheting warning shot fired by a poorly trained and unsupervised CSO could have been avoided.

8. Medication Procedures

During the consultants' visits, it was observed that medication is frequently issued in sufficient quantities at Central Health Unit to allow multiple doses for up to a full week. Upon questioning, it was explained that some inmates were more trustworthy than others, and could be given a week's medication without fear. The consultants strongly recommend that medication be issued by a single dose only. The issuing of daily or weekly doses to some inmates and not others is an arbitrary practice and should cease.

In addition, the consultants could find no consistent policy on methods of recording or inventorying medical supplies, specifically, controlled substances. One pharmacist at the Central Unit was questioned about recordkeeping, and he indicated that he did not know how records were kept at that

facility. The pharmacist was preparing prescription medication during the discussion with the consultants.

It is recommended that personnel from the Department of Corrections working in conjunction with individuals from the State Board of Pharmacy, develop a recordkeeping and inventory system for uniform application in all institutions within the system.

9. Inmate Work and Activities

Throughout the five complexes, it was consistently noted that large numbers of inmates were lounging in the housing areas during daylight hours. State statute requires that all able-bodied inmates be employed in productive labor. The consultants recognize that staff shortages and lack of industries may contribute to inactivity. It is important, however, that a survey of employment needs be conducted throughout the system to determine the exact scope of inactivity and, consequently, the areas where industries or other work opportunities are most needed.

G. Staffing

Due to the time constraints and the large number of facilities to be inspected, the consultants were unable to do a detailed post analysis and evaluate the adequacy of staff deployment and staff allocation. The consultants were able, however, to review materials collected by the Auditor General's staff regarding staff allocations and staffing formula.

From the material reviewed, it is obvious that the Department is using a shift relief factor of 5.0 to calculate the number of staff required to maintain each 24 hour post. Inquiries regarding how this figure was calculated produced numerous responses. In short, there is no consistent method for calculating a shift relief factor.

The consultants recommend that a shift relief factor, based on historical data, be calculated for each facility within the Department. A system-wide shift relief factor may be appropriate for estimating purposes, but is not sufficient to guarantee that each mandatory post is covered 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. A minimum custody institution with a relatively new physical plant is a more pleasant environment than an older, higher security institution with troublesome inmates. Therefore, stress factors on staff will differ from one institution to another. Consequently, staff turnover, absenteeism, sick leave, etc. will be different from one facility to another. All of these factors influence the shift relief formula.

During the consultants' visits to the five facilities, numerous examples of inadequate staffing were found:

- o Santa Rita had only 6 CSO's on the yard for over 600 inmates on July 9, 1985.
- o Tower 13, at Central Unit, is assigned only 1 CSO. There are 3 post positions.
- o The Rincon yard control officer had to leave the station unattended to perform another task.

- o South Unit has only 3 yard officers to supervise the yard and assist the six major dorm officers and supervise movement in all vocational and work areas.
- o Fort Grant does not have sufficient staff to locate an officer at each dorm.
- o Santa Rita had to borrow an officer on the evening of July 11 to assist during the evening meal.
- o Only one CSO mans the North Unit control station.
- o There is only one CSO to supervise the inmates at the Tucson MSU on the midnight shift.

The consultants were unable to determine whether the staff shortages were due to insufficient numbers of personnel, inefficient deployment of personnel, or inadequate evaluation of personnel needs. The consultants recommend that a comprehensive staffing analysis be conducted by an independent authority acceptable to the Department and to its Legislative Oversight Committee. By jointly choosing the authority or consultant to conduct the analysis, the Department's future requests to the Legislature for additional staff will have more credibility, and presumably, more support.

The consultants are of the opinion that a large number of the procedural and operational problems within the Department are due to insufficient staff resources. One of the things which occurs in correctional institutions where overcrowding is prevalent and staff resources are inadequate, is a process called accommodation. Accommodation is a method of staff and inmate interaction which is based on unspoken, unwritten agreement not to "hassle" one another. Officers ignore or conveniently are absent when violation of

regulations occurs (such as sexual activity during visitation) in exchange for less verbal and physical abuse from the inmates. If an officer, without adequate backup, attempts to rigidly enforce the rules, he may find himself in serious difficulty. Accordingly, he uses common sense and only intervenes when serious violations occur.

It should be clearly understood that no one within the Department articulated the existence of **accommodation**. It is simply a process which emerges under a combination of circumstances. In this case, overcrowding, facility inadequacies, and staff shortages contribute favorably to the development and evolution of **accommodation**.

H. Adequacy of Countermeasures

The Department of Corrections staff and facility administrators have undertaken a number of countermeasures to improve perimeter security and correct perimeter detection system equipment failures.

The present proposed purchase and installation of a vindicator central processing unit to replace the existing Secom unit at Perryville and the Tucson complex should successfully resolve the existing problems with the present equipment.

It must be noted, however, that the extremes in temperature in the southwest desert may be expected to cause false alarms in the detection system's operation. The purchase of a new perimeter security detection system and installation contracts should require and include the initial maintenance and support of the system with extended guarantees to guard against system failure.

Individual units have constructed towers to provide surveillance of their perimeters. These towers are temporary structures constructed of available scaffolding, topped with a plywood and 2x4 guard stations. These towers are not safe for continual extended use and pose a generally unsafe working condition for assigned staff.

Towers are appropriate at facilities that have a physical plant which has secure inmate housing and internal controls which will support a level 5 or level 6 custody rating.

Facilities which have lower custody level ratings may improve their facility perimeter with the installation of razor tape on the inside of the outer perimeter fence and on the ground, anchored securely, in front of the fence to prevent inmates from gaining contact with the fence in order to cut it.

Coupled with this physical barrier which will provide delay in any escape attempt, a roving perimeter patrol should patrol outside the fence and a roving patrol should patrol inside the fence. The roving patrols on the exterior and interior may be an officer with an attack dog partner. An extended fence perimeter, like the Perryville complex, requires four mobile patrols outside the fence and two inside at the main complex. The Santa Maria Unit may be patrolled by one outside patrol and one inside patrol to assist with the outside patrol.

The Tucson complex should be staffed with 3 perimeter patrols and one interior patrol.

The Department of Corrections must adopt a classification plan and assign only inmates up to that custody level to that facility. Concurrently, the Department of Corrections must develop and adopt an objective classification plan and integrate the facility custody level with the placement of inmates in the appropriate facility.

The Department of Corrections must adopt a reasonable facility custody level rating for each facility. Concurrently, the Department of Corrections must develop and adopt an objective classification plan so the two may be integrated to ensure that appropriately classified inmates are assigned to a facility which has a custody rating not lower than that of the inmate.

I. Cost of Modifications

In an effort to assist the Department in defining cost parameters for the recommendations contained in this report, the consultants have prepared the following unit cost data:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Source</u>
Towers	\$80,000	Each	AZ DOC
12' fence w/30" concrete curb	\$50	Foot	American Security Fence Phoenix
36" Concertina Razor Tape	\$6.00	Foot	American Security Fence Phoenix
Installation	\$1.25	Foot	American Security Fence Phoenix
30" Concertina Razor Tape	\$5.00	Foot	American Security Fence Phoenix
Installation	.75	Foot	American Security Fence Phoenix
42"x42" Security Sash Spb-1	\$2000	Each	William Bayley Co. Springfield, Ohio
Armortex TC-300 Bullet-Proof Glazing	\$66	Sq. Ft.	Safeguard Security System San Antonio, Texas
Armortex D-3 Detention Glazing	\$35	Sq. Ft.	Safeguard Security System San Antonio, Texas
Motorola Hand Held Radio	\$2575	Each	DPS DOC Radio Expansion Study
Metor 118 Metal Detector	\$4700	Each	Outokumpu Engineering Denver, Colorado

IV. CONCLUSION

In a short period of time, the consultants have identified a number of serious deficiencies in physical, procedural, and staffing measures as they relate to security within the five facilities audited in the Arizona Department of Corrections. The consultants, however, wish to clarify that this Audit is restricted to observations and comments regarding current practices and conditions.

A. Current Conditions

These current conditions did not develop in the last few months. They are the result of inadequate resources, or the inadequate management of resources, over a long period of time. It was not within the scope of this Audit to determine whether these deficiencies were the result of mismanagement of resources or the inadequate provision of resources.

Likewise, the scope of the Audit did not evaluate the current planning underway within the Department of Corrections. It is apparent to the consultants that the majority of these deficiencies are known to Department officials, and that planning is underway to attempt to develop solutions and corrective action. Considerable progress has been made in certain key areas, such as the reduction of the rate of escapes from Departmental facilities. Despite these efforts by Department officials, however, the State continues to face a crisis of growing dimensions.

B. Review of Information

During the course of the Audit, the consultants reviewed information maintained by the Arizona Department of Administration, Risk

Management Division. This review revealed that claims filed and closed against the Department since 1979 resulted in loss payments of about \$550,000 due to omissions, errors, or neglect. This figure consists of both funds awarded to claimants and the cost of defending the litigation.

A further review of claims filed which have not yet been closed (open cases) is estimated by the Division of Risk Management to represent a potential loss of about \$3.5 million. It should be noted that \$1,087,409 has been estimated as potential losses due to administrative inefficiency (Code 19), which includes claims as a result of escapes and security deficiencies. Another \$1,302,555 is designated as the potential loss for current claims filed under the category "Errors and Omissions" (Code 23). **It should be obvious that past cost saving measures, which were taken at the expense of adequate staffing and security, are becoming a costly omission.**

The consultants recommend a three-fold approach to the correction of existing deficiencies.

1. Immediate Corrective Action

- o A systemwide inventory of security needs and deficiencies should be conducted using this Audit as a guideline. The purpose of the inventory is to determine the exact scope of current deficiencies and to quantify the resulting data so that unit cost data may be applied for estimating and forecasting needed resources.
- o A comprehensive staffing analysis should be conducted by an outside authority or consultant mutually acceptable to

the Department of Corrections and its Legislative Oversight Committee. Once the scope of staffing deficiencies has been identified and clarified, a plan for improvement or reallocation of staff may be developed and implemented.

- o The Department should re-evaluate its current classification system and the custody level classification of existing facilities.

The consultants recommend that an objective computerized classification model be developed and implemented expeditiously. The inmates in the Department should be designated for appropriate housing to facilities with the designated custody or grade levels. This classification model must have selection criteria weighted to such a degree that the classification instrument assigns all inmates to the appropriate custody or grade level with less than 10% override to any grade or classification because of subjective inputs due to escape potential, management problems, or emotional instability. The model should consider:

- o Type of offense
- o Length of offense time served
- o Recent adjustment
- o Past adjustment
- o Prior escapes
- o Type of prior escapes
- o Assaults with weapons

- o Assaults on staff
 - o Narcotic smuggling
 - o Gang membership
 - o Mental illness
 - o Mental retardation
 - o Medical condition
 - o Holds, warrants, or deportation
- o The Central Unit and CB6 currently provide the bulk of the lockup space for the Department. Inmates are transferred in from other facilities, the reception center, or the Central Unit general population. The Central Unit is overcrowded. There are few empty beds to permit flexibility for placement options. Inmates are kept in isolation cells waiting beds in CB6, long-term segregation, or protective custody.

Problem inmates from other facilities are transferred directly into CB6 to get their attention even though their misconduct, violence, or escape potential does not warrant this premium high security housing being utilized for their confinement.

- o The consultants recommend that inmates awaiting investigation or disciplinary action for offenses other than escape or serious assault should be held either at the regional lockup units or in isolation cells at the Central Unit pending appropriate disposition and placement.

- o A large majority of the Central Unit's bed space is occupied with protective custody inmates who do not present behavioral problems. Apparently, there is consideration to house protective custody inmates in CB6, the Department's most secure housing, when a new high security facility is completed. **This appears to be a waste of premium bed space.** Along these lines, CB6 currently houses problem inmates who are not considered emotionally disturbed but retarded with behavioral problems. This appears to be misuse of bed space. **The consultants recommend the placement of inmates in a mental health treatment facility should be considered.**
- o CB6 and the Central Unit appear to be a departmental bottleneck. More appropriate use of Central Unit bed space and the efficient functioning of this facility is the key to the smooth operation of the entire Department. The Central Unit has a significant portion of its high security cells devoted to protective custody. Many of these inmates are not significant management problems or escape risks, but are occupying maximum security beds. These PC's are a bottleneck to the entire system.
- o The consultants recommend that the department have two levels of PC's. The high risk PC's should be housed at the Central Unit, but these should be screened out to a manageable number.

- o The consultants recommend that the minimum unit at Perryville, San Pedro, be converted to a 200 man departmental PC unit or that one of the other 300 man units be converted to a PC unit. In any case, the minimum unit at San Pedro can be converted to a medium or close level 3 or 4 unit with a moderate investment in capital improvement and personnel. Currently, expensive cells are being occupied by minimum custody inmates who could be assigned to inexpensive housing.

Perryville could have one unit fenced off and devoted to protective custody housing by installing some additional fencing, razor wire, and adding personnel. Procedural changes would permit dining hall feeding, religious, and other activities for a large section of the protective custody inmates.

- o The Arizona Department of Corrections has at least three dangerous prison gangs: The Mexican Mafia, Texas syndicate, and Aryan Brothers, whose code is "blood in blood out — kill as ordered, or be killed." It does not matter how well these inmates program, what custody level or how near to release they are. Once they join the gang and take the blood oath, they must do as ordered. These inmates are now spread throughout the Department.

The Florence complex inspections and the Investigative Unit seem to have good knowledge of the actual gang membership; however, because of public information

requirements and possible court orders to reveal lists of memberships, lists of gangs are not kept and the information is not kept in the inmates' central files.

Classification currently does not have access to gang memberships. The consultants recommend that actual gang members of the prison gangs that have the "kill or be killed" credo be housed in a level 5 or 6 facility, Central, or CB6. Apparently, there are approximately 200 of these individuals, many already housed at these two facilities. The consultants recommend that once all the gang inmates are housed at CB6 and Central Unit prior to their classification and possible transfer to other facilities, classification submit a list of the next week's classification list to investigators for their identification of confirmed gang members.

Currently, no one in the system is safe from gang retaliation. This threat of gang attack has to contribute greatly to the increasing protective custody population.

o The Department of Corrections should continue and expand its efforts to re-evaluate and re-write, if necessary, Departmental policies, procedures, and post orders. Particularly, attention should be paid to the following area:

- o Inmate counts
- o Use of deadly force
- o Ladder security

- o Weapon stock and paraphernalia
- o Hobby tools
- o Inmate owned tools
- o Bench grinder control
- o Welding equipment
- o Hazardous, toxic, and explosive substance controls
- o Daily security checks of perimeters
- o Daily security checks of locks, bars, gates, doors, windows, etc.
- o Hacksaws and cutting tools
- o Motor vehicle parking outside secure perimeter

2. Mid-Term Objectives

Upon completion of the inventory of current security deficiencies, corrective action may be initiated to restore the integrity of the Department's security systems and subsystems. **Concurrently, however, it is recommended that the Department evaluate and upgrade its current facility master planning in order to avoid future occurrences of these deficiencies.** A realistic cost effective master plan is needed to guide development of future facilities in order to meet the system's future security needs. It is important that future funding is allocated to measures that produce an increase in public protection rather than a decrease.

3. Long-Term Planning

Based on the rapid growth of the inmate population in the State of Arizona, expansion of facility capacity seems to

be inevitable. The Legislature may wish to evaluate criminal code revisions or other means of slowing prison population growth rather than commit to massive construction over the long-term.

Regardless of the direction of future systems planning, a closer working relationship between the executives and legislative branches is essential to the continued safety and security of the State prison system. It is not a system that can be neglected over the long-term without creating serious and costly consequences. The consultants encourage a needed dialogue and communication to bring about the required results.

**ANALYSIS OF THE
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
OFFENDER CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM**

A Report to

The State of Arizona
Office of the Auditor General

CORRECTIONAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.

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NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

James Austin, Ph.D.
Paul Litsky

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a result of the general public's and state legislature's concerns with the operation of the Arizona Department of Corrections, the Auditor General was directed to conduct a performance audit of the Department. A preliminary assessment determined that the Department's classification system appeared to be ineffective with respect to security assessment. In response to this perception, Correctional Services Group, Inc., was retained by the Auditor General to evaluate whether the Department is properly classifying inmates and to develop projections of inmates who could be eligible for early release programs, as well as make recommendations for immediate and long-term steps to alleviate subjectivity and misclassification within the system.

In order to determine the extent of misclassification, the Federal Prison System (FPS) Custody Determination Instrument was used to simulate the conditions under which a sample of the Arizona DOC stock population would be classified. The results of this simulation indicated that the Department does tend to overclassify inmates at initial classification. This is particularly the case for medium custody, where almost 59% of the inmate population is assigned following assessment at the Alhambra Reception and Treatment Center; this compares to approximately 21% using the FPS model. However, for maximum custody there is moderate underclassification since approximately 26% of the sample was initially assessed as maximum custody in contrast to more than 30% based on the FPS approach. The Department assigned only an estimated 13% to minimum custody versus the 47% suggested by the federal system.

The apparent reasons for the high number of medium custody assignments include the Department's present custody classification criteria, which are essentially controlled by length of confinement at initial classification, and the large number of medium custody housing units that the agency must fill.

At reclassification, comparisons between the Department's and FPS's classification approaches are much more similar in that the Department reduced its medium custody population to 45% and increased the minimum custody portion to almost 36% versus 17% and 51%, respectively, for the FPS approach. Maximum custody, however, is more divergent since the Department classified less than 18% of its population in that level compared to almost 31% using the federal system.

These findings result in two inevitable conclusions: additional inmate housing is required at both ends of the custody scale and an objective classification system is warranted.

These findings have two important ramifications on bed space requirements. First, additional maximum security housing is required. Using the FPS simulation, an estimated 1,410 high security beds are now needed. These could be either new construction or upgrades of some of the higher security, medium custody facilities. At the other end of the custody continuum, an additional

1,300 minimum custody beds could be occupied without substantially endangering the welfare of the public. However, the maximum security beds are much more urgently needed, given the serious security and safety issues that have resulted and will continue to occur when space is unavailable to adequately control the Department's maximum custody inmate population.

An objective classification system is needed to minimize discretion while maximizing the best use of the Department's scarce inmate beds. This system, which would incorporate the concepts of public and institutional risk, would have the following advantages:

- Improvement in uniformity and consistency of offender classification decisions;
- Improvement in the documentation of classification decisions;
- Increased ability to determine the predictiveness and significance of factors used in determining security and custody;
- Ability to adapt to changing laws, policies, and offender populations;
- Maintenance of a system that is responsive to individual inmate characteristics and needs;
- Objective rating of facility program and security capabilities and resources; and
- Ability to serve as a management and planning mechanism.

The report^{*} also includes a number of recommendations to improve the overall classification system. These are grouped into the following categories: classification system decision-making; classification information needs; initial classification issues; institutional classification issues; central office classification issues; and special management inmate issues.

The final component of this study was devoted to assessing the percentage of inmates who could be released early from confinement with a low risk of becoming rearrested. The findings demonstrated, using the Selective Incapacitation Model developed by NCCD, that slightly more than 9% of the inmate population could be released early with only a minimal chance of being rearrested in the first year, while over 6%, if released early, would quite likely be rearrested during the same timeframe.

* A copy of the entire report is available for review at the Office of the Auditor General, 2700 N. Central Avenue, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.